Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law by Sunstein, Cass R. & Posner, Eric A.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers Working Papers
2006
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law
Cass R. Sunstein
Eric A. Posner
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
public_law_and_legal_theory
Part of the Law Commons
Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be aware that
a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or elsewhere.
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public
Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein & Eric Posner, "Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law" (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper No. 128, 2006).
CHICAGO  
 
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 128 
 
 
 
 
CHEVRONIZING FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
 
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein 
 
 
THE  LAW  SCHOOL  
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  
 
 
June 2006 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 
Series:  http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html and 
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=905965  
Draft 5/25/06 
All rights reserved 
 
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law 
 
Eric A. Posner* and Cass R. Sunstein** 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A number of judge-made doctrines attempt to promote international comity by 
reducing possible tensions between the United States and foreign sovereigns. For 
example, ambiguous statutes are usually interpreted to conform to international law, and 
statutes are usually not understood to apply outside of the nation’s territorial boundaries. 
The international comity doctrines are best understood as a product of a judicial 
judgment that in various settings, the costs of American deference to foreign interests are 
less than the benefits to American interests. Sometimes Congress balances these 
considerations and incorporates its judgment in a statute, but usually it does not. In such 
cases, executive interpretations should be permitted to trump the comity doctrines. This 
conclusion is supported both by considerations of institutional competence and by the 
distinctive position of the President in the domain of foreign affairs. It follows that if the 
executive wants to interpret ambiguous statutes so as to apply extraterritorially, or so as 
to conflict with international law, it should be permitted to do so. The analysis of the 
interpretive power of the executive follows by reference to the Chevron doctrine in 
administrative law, which similarly calls for deference to executive interpretation of 
statutory ambiguities. Sometimes the Chevron doctrine literally applies to executive 
interpretations; sometimes it operates as a valuable analogy. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Federal law contains a range of international comity doctrines, developed by 
judges in order to reduce tensions between the United States and other nations. These 
doctrines instruct courts to interpret American law in a way that avoids conflict with, or 
offense to, foreign sovereigns. The international comity doctrines are a subset of what we 
shall call international relations doctrines—doctrines that control how courts decide cases 
that influence foreign relations but that do not always require courts to defer to the 
interests of foreign sovereigns. Our modest goal here is to offer a sympathetic 
reconstruction of the underpinnings of these doctrines. Our more ambitious goal is to 
suggest that in the current period, courts should permit executive interpretations of 
ambiguous statutory terms to overcome the international relations doctrines. This 
approach would greatly simplify current law; it would also allocate authority to those in 
the best position to balance the competing interests. 
                                                 
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
** Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago. Thanks to Curt Bradley, Jacob Gerson, Jack Goldsmith, Matthew Stephenson, and 
David Strauss for helpful comments, and to Stacey Nathan for excellent research assistance. 
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To understand the operation of the international relations doctrines, consider the 
following cases:  
 
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of sex.1 
American businesses are operating in Saudi Arabia; they discriminate against 
female workers, who are also Americans. The workers bring suit, contending 
that the statute has been violated. Under the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, ambiguous statutes are not applied to conduct that occurs on 
foreign territory.2 It follows that unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, 
the prohibition on sex discrimination applies only within the physical 
boundaries of the United States.3 The usual rationale, applied here, would be 
to prevent offense to Saudi Arabia. But does Saudi Arabia really care about 
sex discrimination by American businesses practiced against American 
employees? Even if it does, does it care enough that the discriminatory 
practice should be tolerated? The executive branch, which has the best 
information about relations with Saudi Arabia, says no.4 Should courts defer 
to the executive? 
 
2. The Immigration and Naturalization Act authorizes the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to detain dangerous aliens who cannot be 
repatriated because their home countries will not accept them. The INS 
interprets this authorization as permitting it to hold an alien convicted of 
manslaughter for an indefinite period. The alien brings suit, arguing that the 
INS has violated the statute, which is unclear on the particular question. Under 
the Charming Betsy doctrine, which requires courts to construe ambiguous 
statutes so as not to violate international law, the immigration statute should 
not be interpreted to permit “prolonged and arbitrary” detention, which 
violates international human rights law.5 The executive branch, which has 
good information about the consequences of violating international law, 
argues against use of the Charming Betsy doctrine. Should courts defer to the 
executive? 
 
3. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) generally forbids lawsuits 
against foreign sovereigns in American courts, but it contains a number of 
exceptions, one of which permits suits in cases of expropriations of property 
in violation of international law. A plaintiff sues Austria, arguing that it 
expropriated art works that belonged to her family during and after World 
War II. Prior to enactment of the FSIA in 1976, the judge-made foreign 
sovereign immunity doctrine did not contain an exception for illegal 
                                                 
1 42 USC 2000(e)(2). 
2 See Small v. United States, 544 US 385 (2005).  
3 EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). The actual case involved discrimination on 
the basis of race, religion, and national origin. 
4 Cf. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 124 S Ct 2169 (2005) (involving application of Americans 
With Disabilities Act to foreign-flagged ships, urged by the executive branch). 
5 Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
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expropriations. The executive branch argues that the FSIA should not apply 
retroactively, apparently because it fears that litigation would upset delicate 
international arrangements to provide compensation of victims of Nazi 
oppression where necessary. Should the court accept the interpretation of the 
executive branch?6 
 
Each of these examples raises two questions. The first involves the operation of 
the international relations doctrines. Why, exactly, should courts assume that statutes 
should be interpreted to avoid extraterritorial application (as in the first example) and 
violations of international law (as in the second example)? The conventional explanation 
is that otherwise foreign sovereigns will be offended, but neither of our first two 
examples provides a strong case for such a view.7 Indeed, the third example is a case in 
which the Supreme Court was willing to risk offending a foreign sovereign in order to 
vindicate another, competing principle. We will argue that the international relations 
doctrines are best understood by reference to an account that emphasizes the costs of 
deferring to foreign interests, which may be substantial, as well as the benefits. As we 
shall show, important American interests may justify giving offense to foreign 
sovereigns, including, for example, the interests in vindicating laws forbidding 
discrimination and protecting environmental harm and endangered species.8 
 
The second question involves the role of the executive. When the executive 
advances an interpretation of a statute that violates international comity doctrines (the 
first two examples) or otherwise places a strain on the ordinary meaning of a statute (the 
third example), should the executive’s interpretation be entitled to respect? This question 
has not yet been answered by the courts. Drawing an analogy to the Chevron doctrine in 
                                                 
6 Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004).  
7 The literature on the international comity doctrines is too large to cite here, but in any event it is 
overwhelmingly doctrinal and historical, not theoretical. On comity itself, see, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Comity in 
International Law, 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (1991) (arguing that the discretionary use of comity is a means by 
which courts balance domestic and foreign interests); Michael Ramsey, Escaping International Comity, 83 
Iowa L. Rev. 893 (1998) (exploring uses and limits of comity principles). On the Charming Betsy canon, 
see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the 
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L.J. 479 (1998) (arguing that the canon should be used by 
courts to determine the intent of the political branches). On extraterritoriality, see, e.g., Larry Kramer, 
Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 179 (1991) (objecting 
that the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the presumption of extraterritoriality is outdated). On the 
act of state doctrine, see, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (1998) (arguing that courts have unnecessarily applied the doctrine broadly to investment 
contracts with foreign governments); Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal 
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1907 (1992) (noting the difference in 
application of the doctrine to liberal and nonliberal states, finding liberal states sometimes are subject to 
more stringent evaluation). On the Foreign Sovereign Immunities act, see, e.g. Joseph W. Dellapenna, 
Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations ch. 7 (2d ed. 2003). We will cite other sources, infra. 
8 See, e.g., EDF v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (interpreting the National Environmental Policy 
Act to apply extraterritorially, at least to Antarctica, even in the face of claim that application of NEPA 
would violate the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty); Born Free USA v. Norton, 
278 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C 2003) (refusing to apply NEPA extraterritorially to protect wild elephants in 
Swaziland); NRDC v. US Department of the Navy, 2002 US Dist. LEXIS 26360 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (accepting 
regulation applying Endangered Species Act to the high seas, even outside of the United States) 
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administrative law,9 and arguing that often Chevron applies directly, we contend that 
courts should defer to the executive on the ground that the resolution of ambiguities 
requires judgments of policy and principle, and the foreign policy expertise of the 
executive places it in the best position to make those judgments.  
 
 The importance of the international relations doctrines has been growing over 
time, a consequence of the increasing frequency of cross-border activity and the 
corresponding efforts of the U.S. government to regulate that activity. At one time, the 
U.S. government was not intensely concerned about conduct on foreign soil, because 
such conduct had little or no impact on the well-being of American citizens. Today, the 
U.S. government often does care about that conduct. One reason is that foreign firms 
produce goods that compete in the world market with goods produced in the United 
States, and hence the conduct of foreign businesses might greatly affect American 
workers and consumers. Antitrust law can be used against foreign businesses to ensure 
that they do not engage in anticompetitive practices that injure Americans.10 To say the 
least, American citizens have a strong interest in freedom from sex discrimination, but 
application of American law to actions in (say) Saudi Arabia or Iraq might well cause 
international tensions. Americans also care about whether foreign sovereigns adequately 
investigate and prosecute international terrorists who plot on their soil but conduct 
operations in the United States. All of these activities are potentially governed by the 
international relations doctrines. 
 
 As we shall see, the doctrines have plausible justifications. Courts are alert to the 
risks of creating international tensions, and in many cases they seem to be making a 
presumptive judgment that to the United States, deferring to the interests of foreign 
sovereigns can produce benefits for Americans that outweigh the costs. For this reason, 
courts have concluded that that the national lawmaker must explicitly authorize 
extraterritorial application of domestic law, or a violation of international law, or any 
other decision that threatens international comity. But there are strong reasons, rooted in 
constitutional understandings and in institutional competence, to allow the executive 
branch to resolve issues of international comity, at least where the underlying statute is 
unclear.11 Suppose that the executive branch interprets an antitrust statute, or the 
                                                 
9 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
10 U.S. antitrust litigation against foreign firms doing business on foreign soil has been a significant source 
of international tension. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration 916-18 (3rd 
ed. 2006). So have American discovery practices. See id. 
11 Thus, we agree with Curtis Bradley’s conclusion that the Charming Betsy doctrine and the presumption 
against extraterritoriality—two of the doctrines we discuss—should not prevail over Chevron deference. 
See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649, 679 (2000) (courts 
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes even if such interpretations may violate 
international law). We also believe that Bradley correctly emphasizes the executive’s superior expertise in 
foreign relations. But his argument and ours is different. Ours is theoretical and functional, albeit 
influenced by constitutional constraints; his is predominantly doctrinal, focused on the source of law. Thus, 
unlike us, he argues that Chevron deference is not appropriate for (for example) the act of state doctrine, a 
doctrine of federal common law, because “there is no basis for presuming a delegation of lawmaking power 
to the executive branch, and (unlike head-of-state immunity, for example) these doctrines are not based on 
the executive branch’s independent lawmaking powers.” Id. at 716. Bradley also does not try to advance a 
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Endangered Species Act, to apply abroad in violation of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. The executive branch is in an exceedingly good position to balance the 
relevant interests, and it can also claim a constitutional warrant for making the underlying 
judgments in the face of congressional silence. 
 
 This simple argument fits with the logic of some recent decisions,12 but it also has 
radical implications. The most obvious is that courts should play a smaller role in 
interpreting statutes that touch on foreign relations than they currently do. Another is that 
the executive branch should be given greater power to decide whether the U.S. will 
violate international law than it currently has. Yet another is that comity-related 
ambiguities in any grant of power to the President, including an authorization to use 
force, should be settled by the executive, even if international law is inconsistent with the 
executive’s view. Our argument also implies greater deference to the executive when it 
intervenes in private litigation. Under our approach, the international relations doctrines 
would continue to resolve cases in which the executive has not taken a position. In such 
cases, the default assumption would follow the established doctrines; an affirmative 
statement by the executive would be necessary to overcome that assumption. But if such 
a statement is forthcoming, and so long as it is reasonable, the courts would promote 
comity, or reject comity, only to the extent that the executive wanted that result.  
 
II. International Relations Doctrines 
 
 Over a period of many years, courts have adopted numerous rules for litigation 
that touches on the interests of foreign sovereigns or their citizens. These rules apply in 
the absence of congressional guidance; the national legislature is permitted to settle the 
underlying questions as it chooses. Most of these doctrines are specifically designed to 
promote comity. Others, however, must be justified in other terms, because they promote 
American interests at the expense of comity. 
 
A. Comity Doctrines 
 
 Charming Betsy canon. The Charming Betsy canon provides that an ambiguous 
statute will be interpreted so as to avoid conflicts with international law. Return to one of 
cases with which we began: An ambiguous law that permits the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service to detain an alien who cannot be repatriated will not be interpreted 
as permitting indefinite detention, because such detention would violate the prohibition of 
“prolonged and arbitrary” detention in international law.13 
 
 Extraterritoriality. The presumption against extraterritoriality provides that an 
ambiguous statute will be interpreted not to apply to territory outside the United States. 
                                                                                                                                                 
theory of the international comity doctrines, as we do. Of course he was unable to explore the many recent 
developments in the law governing judicial review of agency interpretations of law, traced below. 
12 See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005), and in particular the 
emphasis on “our customary policy of deference to the President in matters of foreign affairs.” Id. 
13 Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001). The canon gets its name from Murray v. The Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (interpreting statute prohibiting trade with France so as not to 
apply to citizen of neutral state, which would have violated international law of neutrality). 
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not explicitly say whether it applies abroad or not; it is 
therefore interpreted not to apply to discriminatory behavior of American businesses 
located in Saudi Arabia.14 It has similarly been held that the National Environmental 
Policy Act, which is silent on the question of extraterritorial application, does not apply 
abroad, and hence does not (for example) require an environmental impact statement for 
U.S. military installations in Japan.15 
 
 Act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine provides that a court may not 
evaluate the act of another state that takes place within its own territory. Shortly after the 
Cuban revolution, the Cuban government expropriated sugar that belonged to an 
American company. Another firm entered a contract with Cuba for the sugar, but refused 
to pay for it after the sugar was delivered, fearing that it might be liable to the victim of 
expropriation. Cuba sued the buyer for breach of contract in an American court, and the 
buyer defended itself by arguing that Cuba did not have clear title to the sugar because 
the expropriation was illegal. Under the act of state doctrine, the court may not accept 
this argument because it would involve an evaluation of Cuba’s conduct; it must assume 
that Cuba’s title is valid.16 
 
 Foreign sovereign immunity. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court 
developed the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, according to which foreign 
sovereigns are granted immunity from liability for violation of the law.17 The rule was 
relaxed in the twentieth century, mainly in cases involving a commercial defendant 
owned by a foreign sovereign.18 In 1976, the doctrine was codified in the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity Act.19 Originally a judge-made doctrine, the idea of foreign 
immunity is now governed by a statute that contains various exceptions that judge-made 
law never recognized—for example, denying immunity to state sponsors of terrorism.20 A 
related doctrine provides immunity to heads of state.21 
 
 Comity in general. Case law equivocates between calling international comity a 
rule and a value. As a value, it reflects the sense that cases affecting foreign interests 
should be decided in a manner that accounts for these interests in some way—hence our 
reference to “international comity doctrines” in general. Courts sometimes cite 
international comity as an explanation for outcomes that are not explicitly driven by the 
doctrines we have discussed, and here comity is sometimes treated as a value.22 For 
example, the Supreme Court cited international comity in explaining why courts should 
                                                 
14 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). We note below some complexities in this 
decision and surrounding doctrine. 
15 See NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D.D.C .1993); see also ARC Ecology v. 
U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that CERCLA does not apply 
extraterritorially to an American military base in the Philippines). 
16 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
17 The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812), 
18 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-89 (1983) (discussing history). 
19 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602. 
20 Id., § 1605(a)(7). 
21 Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004). 
22 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (holding that antitrust 
claims were properly arbitrated under the Arbitration Act).  
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defer to the judgments of international arbitrators used to resolve international contractual 
disputes.23 In a recent case, Justice Breyer cited concerns about international comity to 
explain his uneasiness with application of the Alien Tort Statute to cases in which both 
parties are aliens and the tortious conduct took place on foreign territory.24 Courts also 
appeal to international comity to justify staying litigation in the United States when 
parallel litigation exists in foreign countries.25 In these ways, comity operates as a 
freestanding value that sometimes enters into the resolution of difficult cases. 
 
 Taken as a whole, this body of doctrines implies that courts should take seriously 
the interests of foreign sovereigns, to the extent that domestic statutes are silent or 
ambiguous on the issues, and even sometimes when domestic statutes are fairly clear. An 
American court might offend foreign sovereigns by violating international law that 
reflects their interests; by interfering with their regulation of activities on their territory; 
by taking cases in whose resolution they have a strong interest; by judging their activities; 
or by issuing judgments against them.  
 
B. Anticomity Doctrines 
 
 Some international relations doctrines do not promote comity at all. On the 
contrary, they sacrifice comity for the sake of American interests that are perceived as 
important. We shall call these the “anticomity doctrines.” 
 
 The revenue rule. The revenue rule provides that an American court will not 
enforce a tax judgment of another nation.26 Suppose that a Canadian or American citizen 
fails to pay taxes in Canada. The defendant flees to the United States, and the Canadian 
government brings suit in an American court, asking the court to enforce the Canadian 
tax law or a judgment based on it. The revenue rule prohibits the American court from 
enforcing the Canadian tax judgment. Note that the revenue rule is rooted in state rather 
than federal law; notably, it has not been overridden at the national level, and in that 
sense has received national acquiescence over time. 
 
The penal rule. Under the penal rule, the American court is forbidden to enforce a 
foreign criminal judgment.27 By contrast, an American court is generally supposed to 
enforce other types of judgments—for example, breach of contract or tort—unless there 
are public policy reasons not to do so.28 It should be clear that the revenue and penal rules 
                                                 
23 Id.  
24 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
25 See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Kozeny, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1249 (D. Colo. 2000) (stay of 
proceedings granted while litigation proceeded in London); Nippon Emo-Trans Co. v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744 
F. Supp. 1215, 1236 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (stay of proceedings pending the outcome in the Japanese court); see 
also Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that Foundation 
Agreement tribunal was better suited to resolve the dispute because it was more familiar with German law). 
26 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 483 (1987) (“Courts in the United States are not required to 
recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of 
other states”). 
27 Id. 
28 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations §§ 481-82. 
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do not show much respect for the interests of a foreign state—a problem, as we shall see, 
for those who argue that international relations doctrines are supposed to prevent 
entanglements. The penal rule, like the revenue rule, is rooted in state rather than federal 
law.29 
 
 Public Policy Exceptions to Enforcement of Foreign Law and Judgments. The 
revenue and penal rules aside, courts do enforce foreign private law judgments—for 
example, judgments resulting from breaches of contract or torts—and also enforce 
foreign private law when most of the events or transactions take place on foreign soil.30 
And yet standard choice of law rules also contain a significant exception for judgments 
and laws that violate American public policy. American courts refuse to enforce 
judgments of countries that have corrupt or ineffective legal systems.31 They have also 
refused to enforce foreign laws that offend American values or sensibilities—most 
notably, British libel law, which is less protective of expression than the first amendment 
allows in the United States.32 It follows that American courts will not uphold judgments 
against defendants under British libel law, even if ordinary conflicts principles would call 
for such liability. 
 
 These anticomity doctrines assert American interests in the context of 
international relations, potentially or actually at the expense of the interests of other 
countries. These doctrines are, to be sure, rules of state law, while the comity doctrines 
are rules of federal law; nonetheless, the anticomity doctrines do determine legal 
outcomes, and they are applied by federal courts in diversity cases. As we shall now see, 
the existence of doctrines that jeopardize comity casts the international relations doctrines 
in a distinctive light. 
 
III. Behind the Doctrines 
 
 What underlies these various doctrines? It is tempting to suggest that they track 
Congress’ own intentions. Perhaps Congress ordinarily expects and hopes that its 
enactments will be interpreted conformably to international law. Perhaps Congress does 
not want American law to be applied extraterritorially unless the legislature has said so 
                                                 
29 The revenue and penal rules are sometimes said to be examples of a more general “public law taboo” 
against enforcing foreign public law or foreign judgments based on foreign public law in domestic courts. 
See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 61 (2002); Philip J. 
McConnaughay, Reviving the Public Law Taboo, 35 Stan. J. Int’l L. 255 (1999). Public law includes 
antitrust law, securities law, and so forth; not just tax and criminal law. The public law taboo has been 
breaking down, but still remains strong. Id. at 256-57. 
30 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 481. 
31 See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134 (2nd Cir. 2000) (finding that civil war in Liberia 
resulted in corrupt courts, subject to substantial factional pressure); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 
1406 (9th Cir. 1995) (strong anti-American bias, politicization, and secrecy in Iranian courts precluded the 
possibility of a fair and impartial tribunal); Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244 (3rd Cir. 1994) (lack of notice of a 
South Korean entry of order of execution violated due process); Banco Minero v. Ross, 172 S.W. 711 (Tex. 
1915) (no real opportunity for defendant to be heard in Mexican courts, arbitrary denial of an appeal for 
failure to stamp a document).  
32 Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (British 
libel laws violate U.S. public policy because they conflict with First Amendment protections). 
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explicitly. But this explanation seems highly artificial. Congress frequently enacts 
statutes that violate international law, apply extraterritorially, or otherwise ignore notions 
of comity.33 Perhaps Congress’ failure to take these steps explicitly signals its acceptance 
of the outcomes produced by the comity doctrines. But when a statute is silent about 
these issues, Congress is most unlikely to have any intentions or even to have thought 
about the question at all. The comity doctrines are not easily justified as a mere mirror of 
congressional instructions. If there is affirmative evidence, in context, that Congress 
endorses the outcomes indicated by comity, it might be reasonable to speak confidently 
about Congress’ intentions; but in the cases that we are discussing, no such evidence can 
be found.34 
 
 On an alternative view, the doctrines track congressional intentions only because 
they provide the background against which Congress legislates.35 To the extent that some 
of the doctrines are clear and firm – consider the presumption against extraterritoriality – 
Congress might be assumed to want them to apply unless it legislates otherwise. In a 
sense, the doctrines are incorporated by implicit reference. As with the canon against 
retroactivity,36 so too with the comity doctrines: They are part of the fabric of existing 
law, and Congress is best taken to endorse them unless it expressly displaces them.  
 
In our view, this position also suffers from a lack of realism. It is true that the 
doctrines are part of the “background” in the sense that they are invoked by courts in the 
face of congressional silence. But is it plausible to say that Congress, as such, should be 
charged with endorsing them, or even with knowing what they are? Perhaps particular 
legislators, and members of relevant interest groups, are aware of the doctrines. But there 
is a large distance between signaling this possibility and suggesting that Congress should 
be understood to have endorsed the doctrines as part of the background against which it 
does its work. The real basis for the international relations doctrines must be normative; it 
must be that they ought to be taken as part of the legislative background, not that 
Congress does so take them.  
 
 The most common explanation for international comity doctrines is that they 
avoid unnecessary tensions, or entanglements, with foreign states.37 We now evaluate this 
                                                 
33 E.g., Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2006) (Act of State doctrine shall not 
be used to decline jurisdiction over property confiscation violating international law after Jan. 1, 1959); 
Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C.S. §§ 6021-6091 (2006) (mandating the Cuban embargo remain in place until 
a change in government occurs).  
34 See, e.g., EDF v. Masset, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing extraterritorial application of NEPA 
without being able to identify evidence of congressional intentions). 
35 This view is endorsed in NEPA Coalition v. Aspen, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993) (assuming that 
Congress legislates with awareness of presumption against extraterritoriality); Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. 
36 Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). 
37 See Duncan Hollis, Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 881 (2005) (citing Justice 
Scalia’s interpretation of comity as a means of preventing foreign conflict); Molly Warner Lien, The 
Cooperative and Integrative Models of International Judicial Comity, 50 Cath. U.L. Rev. 591 (2001) 
(arguing cooperative comity helps to minimize conflicts with foreign courts); Harold Maier, 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International 
Law, 76 Am. J. Int’l L. 280 (1982) (suggesting that courts cite comity as helping to preserve international 
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conventional wisdom, which we will call the entanglement theory. We will argue that it is 
inferior to a broader theory, which we will call the consequentialist theory. This theory, 
we suggest, helps explain those principles that require a clear congressional judgment on 
certain questions.38 It is important to try to understand the underpinnings of the doctrines, 
and such an understanding is one of our central goals; but as we shall see, the argument 
for deference to executive interpretations follows on either account. 
 
A. Entanglement 
 
 The entanglement theory says that international comity doctrines reduce the risk 
that courts will inadvertently cause foreign policy tensions or crises by offending other 
nations. Courts have made this argument about all of the comity doctrines described 
above. The act of state doctrine prevents courts from angering foreign sovereigns by 
expressing disapproval of their sovereign acts.39 The FSIA similarly prevents courts from 
declaring that a foreign sovereign has violated an American law that the foreign 
government regards as an insult to its sovereignty.40 The presumption against 
extraterritoriality prevents courts from interfering with the ability of foreign governments 
to regulate activity on their own soil,41 in a way that threatens to create international 
conflict.42 The common theme is that a court might inadvertently increase international 
tensions, or in the extreme case even provoke an international crisis, by offending or 
injuring a foreign nation, which then might retaliate against the United States by 
withdrawing its participation in a vital area of international cooperation or directing its 
own courts to commit similar offenses against the United States.  
 
To be sure, the comity doctrines are default rules only; courts will not interfere 
with a legislative determination that America’s interests are advanced despite (or because 
of) the international conflict. But because, all else equal, foreign conflict is bad rather 
than good, courts will assume that it does not serve America’s interests unless Congress 
explicitly says otherwise. 
 
In our view, the theory is superficially attractive but ultimately unpersuasive, 
certainly as an account of the international relations doctrines taken as a whole. The 
problem with the theory is that it identifies the benefits of deferring to foreign sovereigns 
(avoiding offense, retaliation, conflict), but it does not account for the costs of deferring 
to foreign sovereigns (preventing the U.S. from advancing its interests, including the goal 
                                                                                                                                                 
relations and encouraging efficiency in the resolution of disputes through discretionary cooperation 
between foreign courts). 
38 Some doctrines may reflect other considerations as well. For example, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality may reflect a judgment that the costs of enforcement overseas are very high. See Small v. 
U.S., 544 U.S. 385 (2005). We bracket these considerations. 
39 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 415. 
40 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488. 
41 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004) (“This rule of statutory 
construction cautions courts to assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of 
other nations when they write American laws. It thereby helps the potentially conflicting laws of different 
nations work together in harmony—a harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent 
commercial world.”); Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (similar). 
42 Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp.2d 833 (W.D. Mich 1999). 
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of protecting American citizens from antidiscrimination, or preventing the loss of 
endangered species or some other kind of serious environmental harm). Thus, it implies, 
implausibly, that courts should always defer, which they do not.  
 
 An evident difficulty is that the anticomity rules flatly contradict the theory. The 
public policy exception to the choice of law rules permits the court to refuse to enforce a 
foreign judgment or foreign law if it violates American public policy. In order to apply 
this rule, the court must evaluate the sovereign act of a foreign country against American 
policies. In addition, the revenue and penal rules prohibit courts from enforcing foreign 
laws and judgments, in a way that is more likely to increase than to decrease international 
tensions. Strikingly, courts have argued that the revenue and penal rules advance 
international comity by preventing courts from evaluating foreign tax and criminal laws 
case by case.43 But this argument does not bear scrutiny. One would more 
straightforwardly avoid offending foreign sovereigns by enforcing their revenue and 
penal laws than by refusing to enforce them. Indeed, this is the theory of the act of state 
doctrine. 
 
In addition, numerous exceptions to the FSIA permit courts (among other things) 
to evaluate the conduct of foreign sovereigns when they engage in commercial and other 
activities.44 And the Charming Betsy canon requires courts to determine what 
international law is, and such a determination will often require a court to evaluate the 
acts of foreign states—for example, whether they have really consented to a norm of 
customary international law or not. Might not foreign sovereigns be offended when 
American courts hold that their laws violate public policy, or refuse to enforce their tax 
judgments and fines, or decline to grant them immunity, or reject their claim that some 
norm of international law exists? These judgments will frequently trouble foreign 
sovereigns, potentially leading to foreign policy tensions that will need to be resolved. 
 
 None of this means that the avoidance of foreign entanglements plays no role in 
existing doctrine. As we mentioned, a foreign entanglement—more accurately, causing 
offense to a foreign state—is a real cost. Consider, for example, an effort to invoke the 
National Environmental Policy Act to block a joint United States-Russian plan for the 
transportation of nuclear material—an effort that, if successful, might cause serious 
tensions with Russia.45 Gratuitous tensions with other nations should certainly be 
avoided. But sometimes tensions are not gratuitous, and the use of the comity principles 
can inflict harm on legitimate American interests as well. If a statute is interpreted so as 
to conform to international law, such interests may be thwarted, in a way that harms 
American citizens. The failure to apply overseas the antitrust laws, the antidiscrimination 
laws, or the environmental laws may mean real injury to American citizens. Perhaps 
some of the doctrines represent a categorical judgment that the risk of international 
                                                 
43 Pasquantino v. U.S., 125 S.Ct. 1766, 1788 (2005) (“the principal evil against which the revenue rule was 
traditionally thought to guard [is] judicial evaluation of the policy-laden enactments of sovereigns”); Moore 
v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir.1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring), aff’d on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 
(1930). 
44 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605. 
45 Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp.2d 833 (W.D. Mich 1999). 
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tension outweighs that injury, at least enough so to require a clear statement from 
Congress. But an analysis of this sort leads in directions that the entanglement theory, 
standing by itself, cannot explain. 
 
 In sum, the problem with the entanglement theory is that entanglements are not 
always bad, the theory provides no basis for distinguishing good or tolerable 
entanglements from bad entanglements, and (most important) the theory says nothing 
about the benefits for American interests that might outweigh the cost of entanglements. 
Taken literally, the entanglement theory suggests that courts should interpret statutes and 
common law rules so as always to defer to foreign sovereigns, but courts clearly do not 
do this. A better theory would explain why courts sometimes defer to foreign interests 
because of the risk of entanglement and sometimes refuse to defer to such interests 
despite the risk of entanglement. 
 
A more refined understanding of the entanglement theory might emphasize an 
institutional point, involving the need for express congressional authorization of courses 
of action that threaten to create tensions with other nations. Without express 
authorization, courts ought not to take steps that threaten to produce international 
conflicts; accidental or inadvertent conflicts should be avoided. The idea is not that 
Congress seeks to avoid entanglements, but that if it has not expressed its will clearly, 
entanglements should be avoided. If they are to occur, it must be because the national 
legislature has specifically authorized them. 
 
 This idea is appealing in the abstract. But for the reasons just stated, an insistence 
on legislative authorization cannot account for all of the international relations doctrines. 
Some of them operate so as to offend foreign sovereigns, even in the face of legislative 
silence. As we have said, international tensions are undesirable, but it may make sense to 
increase the risk of such tensions if doing so promotes important social values (domestic 
and international). Suppose, for example, that extraterritorial application of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, so as to govern environmentally sensitive decisions by the 
United States abroad, could possibly irritate other sovereigns—but at the same time 
would reduce the likelihood of serious environmental harm.46 Is it so clear that NEPA, 
which is ambiguous on the question of extraterritoriality, should be interpreted in a way 
that requires an unambiguous congressional statement in order to apply abroad? In our 
view, the answer is not so clear, which suggests that the underlying explanation for the 
doctrines must lie elsewhere.  
 
B. Consequences and Reciprocity 
 
A more complete explanation is that courts defer to foreign sovereigns after a 
rough assessment of the consequences. Deference occurs when courts believe that the 
benefits of deference exceed the costs. With this formulation, we do not mean a formal 
cost-benefit analysis, which would of course be impossible in the circumstances; the 
point is instead that the doctrines are best understood as rooted in an all-things-
                                                 
46 See, e.g., id; Born Free USA v. Norton, 278 F. Supp 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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considered assessment of consequences, which importantly include the legitimacy and 
strength of the American interests in violating the ordinary requirements of comity. 
 
The costs of deference include the loss of American control over activities whose 
regulation would promote American interests – not simply those of the United States as 
sovereign, but also those of American citizens in ensuring fidelity to the principles 
embodied in American law. The benefits of deference include the reciprocal gains from 
deference, on the part of foreign states, to American regulation and also the reduced 
likelihood of causing international tensions, which could ultimately hurt American 
interests. The benefits will, of course, be obtained only if the foreign sovereign actually 
reciprocates or if the risk of such tensions is real. Thus, deference is based on two factors: 
(1) an empirical determination or conjecture (a) that the foreign state is likely to 
reciprocate or (b) that it would otherwise retaliate in some way; and (2) a judgment that 
the benefits of reciprocation or nonretaliation by foreign states exceed the cost of 
deference by the United States. In our view, intuitive judgments with respect to (1) and 
(2) help to explain the operation of the international relations doctrines, and some 
incongruities as well. Our goal in this section is to defend this claim, both as a way of 
understanding the doctrines and as a general preface to the inquiry into executive 
authority to displace them. 
 
 To see how this consequentialist theory works, consider first the penal rule. The 
cost of deference to a foreign criminal judgment is that the American court may end up 
imposing a sanction on a person on account of a crime that the U.S. does not recognize as 
serious, or of a criminal conviction that emerged from procedures that the U.S. does not 
recognize as just. If the defendant is not an American citizen, that cost might not be 
deemed especially large; but surely the United States is interested in avoiding the use of 
its courts to collaborate in injustice. If the defendant is an American citizen, then the cost 
will be that much larger. The benefit of deference is that if foreign states reciprocate, 
people convicted in American courts who flee to foreign jurisdictions will be forced to 
pay the American fine; thus, American criminal enforcement is strengthened. The penal 
rule is best understood as reflecting American uneasiness with foreign criminal 
procedures, in which traditional American criminal protections against unjust 
convictions, including the jury, are often absent.47 To avoid enforcing foreign 
convictions, the U.S. is willing to give up enforcement of American convictions abroad. 
Other nations appear to hold similar views.48 Indeed, extraterritorial enforcement of 
criminal law occurs mainly through elaborate extradition treaties, which usually ensure 
that the acts in question are criminal in both states and contain numerous other 
protections.49 
 
 Now consider the choice of law rules. In this context, the consequentialist analysis 
plausibly yields a different outcome. Enforcing foreign civil judgments does not greatly 
offend American notions of justice, because we have lower standards for civil procedure 
than for criminal procedure, and our standards are not that different from those of other 
                                                 
47 The point is made explicitly in Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005). 
48 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 482, reporters’ note 3. 
49 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 475. 
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major liberal democracies. Importantly, enforcing such judgments promotes trade and 
investment, especially if foreign sovereigns enforce American judgments as well. But 
where the civil laws of other countries do offend American public policy, the laws and 
judgments are not enforced. Here, as before, other nations appear to have the same 
attitude, so U.S. courts would not induce reciprocal benefits even if they acted 
otherwise.50 
 
 The act of state doctrine requires U.S. courts to treat the acts of foreign sovereigns 
within their own territory as valid.51 Though the contours of the doctrine are ambiguous, 
one of its chief effects is to ensure the enforcement of acts taken within the territory of 
the foreign sovereign, and regulating behavior on the foreign territory. Putting the public 
policy doctrine and the act of state doctrine together, we can see that American courts 
implicitly presume that foreign states have a greater interest in regulating activity on their 
territory, and a weaker interest in regulating activity on American territory—and 
similarly for the U.S. government. This presumption seems entirely reasonable. As long 
as other states behave similarly, and they appear to do so,52 the American courts ensure 
that the U.S. obtains the reciprocal benefit of control over its own territory in return for 
deference to foreign regulation of activities on foreign territory. 
 
 This fundamental idea—that states regulate activities on their own territories and 
thus have little or no power over the activities that occur in foreign states—plainly 
underlies the presumption against extraterritoriality. The U.S. gains from this rule insofar 
as it avoids interference with its domestic regulation, but loses from this rule insofar as it 
is prevented from regulating activities on foreign soil. All in all, the rule almost certainly 
creates a net benefit. The U.S. generally has little interest in what occurs on foreign soil, 
and other states have little interest in what occurs on American soil. As we have noted, 
there are significant exceptions, but the overall assessment is fairly clear, and hence the 
presumption applies, subject to congressional override.53 
 
 One of these exceptions provides further evidence of the existence of 
consequentialist balancing on the part of courts. International law recognizes that a ship 
at sea is under the jurisdiction of the state whose flag it flies, and this rule is generally 
recognized in U.S. law. But when foreign ships are in American territorial waters, general 
American statutes apply to protect the peace of the port, with the exception that “[a]bsent 
a clear statement of congressional intent, general statutes may not apply to foreign-flag 
                                                 
50 Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (English anti-
suit injunction sought to prevent U.S. courts from adjudicating claims). 
51 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 443, reporters’ note 1. 
52 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 443, reporters’ note 12. 
53 For an argument in favor of extraterritorial application of antitrust and securities laws, on the ground that 
judges are bad at balancing, and that it is preferable for the government to negotiate treaties with foreign 
states that object to the laws, see Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and 
Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a “Choice-of-Law” Approach, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1799 (1992). 
For a somewhat related argument, see William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory, 
39 Harv. Int’l L.J. 101 (1998). As we note, infra, we favor rules if decision costs are high; whether the rule 
should be in favor of extraterritorial application or against it depends on the costs and benefits, which are 
best assessed by the executive in the face of legislative silence or ambiguity. 
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vessels insofar as they regulate matters that involve only the internal order and discipline 
of the vessel, rather than the peace of the port.”54 The special treatment of the “peace of 
the port” suggests that America’s interest in maintaining security in its ports and coastal 
waters outweighs the foreign interest—more precisely, America’s interest in deferring to 
the foreign interest—in regulating conduct onboard. Thus, the National Labor Relations 
Act does not apply to the crew of the foreign ship, but ordinary criminal laws do.55 
Moreover, the NLRA is applicable to labor relations between American longshoremen 
and the foreign ship.56 
 
 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act reflects a more complex balancing. The 
United States prohibits plaintiffs from suing foreign sovereigns on account of sovereign 
acts such as acts of war or the use of police powers; the loss to American interests is 
thought to be outweighed by the gain—avoiding affront to foreign sovereigns and 
reducing the risk of litigation against the U.S. government on account of its sovereign 
acts in foreign courts.57 But the important exception for commercial activity is also 
mutually beneficial, as it permits wholly owned commercial entities to make enforceable 
contractual commitments when they do business on foreign territory. 
 
 Finally, the Charming Betsy canon reflects the consequentialist calculus in a 
particularly straightforward way. For the most part, states join international treaties and 
consent to customary international law when doing so is in their interest.58 Thus, 
international law already reflects the outcome of a consequentialist calculus. A particular 
rule benefits the U.S. by constraining the activity of other states but hurts the U.S. by 
constraining the U.S.; nonetheless, on balance the political branches believe that the rule 
provides a net benefit for the U.S. If Congress then passes a statute that violates 
international law, states protected by that law may retaliate against the U.S. government. 
It is reasonable to assume that the cost of retaliation exceeds the benefit of the new 
legislation, given that the U.S. government consented to (say) the treaty in the first place 
because it believed the benefits from international cooperation would exceed the costs, 
including the cost of refraining from future legislation inconsistent with the treaty. Of 
course, in any given case the costs and benefits may have changed; that is why Congress 
is permitted to pass laws that violate international law as long as the laws are clear 
enough. 
 
 On the other side, the revenue rule provides a potential counterexample to our 
thesis. It seems, at first sight, doubtful that enforcement of foreign tax judgments would 
routinely violate important constitutional and common law norms in the way that 
enforcement of foreign criminal judgments would. Thus, the case for the revenue rule is 
                                                 
54 Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169, 2177 (2005). 
55 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). Spector, 125 S.Ct. at 
2182, further modified the rule by providing that it applies only if the ship’s internal affairs are affected in 
the first place, thus recognizing that a statute may be applied extraterritorially if this does not burden the 
foreign sovereign. 
56 Longshoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 198-201 (1970). 
57 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493. 
58 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law ch. 1 (2005) (discussing 
the literature). 
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weaker than the case for the penal rule. Indeed, one might argue the revenue rule should 
be folded into the standard choice of law analysis, where foreign judgments are evaluated 
on a case by case basis, and rejected only if the judgment, or the legal system that 
produced the judgment, violates American public policy.59 
 
 This argument was addressed in recent years by the Second Circuit in The 
Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc.60 While the court 
recognized the force of the criticisms of the revenue rule, it ended up strongly endorsing 
the rule. The court’s most interesting reason is that, as a matter of historical fact, the U.S. 
government and apparently every other government have strong reservations about 
enforcing the tax judgments of foreign nations. Although the U.S. entered a handful of 
tax treaties many decades ago that provided for enforcement of tax judgments, the Senate 
was unhappy with the collection process. Commenting on some proposed new treaties, 
the relevant Senate Committee said “it is not believed wise to have one government 
collect the taxes which are due another government.”61 The Committee further noted that 
“in many instances, or perhaps all, the courts would be called upon to enforce very harsh 
civil penalties, and it was not deemed wise for our courts to undertake this particular 
job.”62 This was in 1951. Since that time, the executive has apparently come to agree with 
the Committee’s position: 
 
Consistent with this continuing policy, the United States has over the years 
entered into a number of tax treaties with foreign sovereigns that provide for 
information exchange and, sometimes, limited collection assistance, but notably 
fail to make any provision for general enforcement of foreign tax judgments or 
claims. It seems to us that the usual absence in our negotiated tax conventions of 
any provision for the extraterritorial enforcement of a sovereign’s tax judgments 
or claims cannot be not accidental, but instead must reflect the considered policy 
of the political branches of our government. Thus, the political branches of our 
government have clearly expressed their intention to define and strictly limit the 
parameters of any assistance given with regard to the extraterritorial enforcement 
of a foreign sovereign’s tax laws. In this area of foreign relations policy where the 
political branches have primacy, courts must be wary of intruding in a way that 
undermines carefully conceived and negotiated policy choices. Accordingly, as a 
general matter, that version of the revenue rule under which United States courts 
abstain from assisting foreign sovereign plaintiffs with extraterritorial tax 
enforcement is fully consistent with our broader legal, diplomatic, and 
institutional framework.63 
 
Thus, the bright-line revenue rule does reflect a balancing of costs and benefits. The costs 
of enforcing foreign tax judgments are high because these judgments are often harsh and 
                                                 
59 Many scholars take this position. See, e.g., William J. Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: 
An Argument for the Revocation of the Revenue Rule, 22 Hous. J. Int’l L. 265, 277-78 (2000). 
60 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001). 
61 Id. at 117, quoting S. Ex. Rep. No. 1, at 21 (1951), available at 1 Legislative History of United States Tax 
Conventions 605 (1962). 
62 268 F.3d at 117, quoting 1 Legislative History at 1377. 
63 Id. at 119 (footnote omitted). 
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unfair. The benefits are zero if, as the court hints, other states are not willing to enforce 
American tax judgments.64 
 
 There is an interesting question why courts are willing to take a case-by-case 
approach to foreign contract and tort judgments, and not to foreign tax judgments, and 
why the U.S. government has not attempted to alter existing practices. It is not clear that 
any post hoc account adequately explain the current situation. Perhaps the best answer is 
that nations tend to enforce contracts and punish torts in roughly the same way, while 
taking widely varying approaches to taxation, as they do to the enforcement of criminal 
law; thus, courts have more confidence in evaluating the first type of case than the second 
type of case. Whatever the answer, the political branches appear to have concluded that 
objectionable foreign tax judgments are common enough, and the likelihood of foreign 
enforcement of American tax judgments is small enough, that case-by-case evaluation is 
not necessary.65 Where decision costs are high, rules are better than standards. The 
benefits of the revenue rule exceed the costs, and the courts defer to the political 
branches’ judgment.66 
 
 This discussion of the revenue rule should make clear that the rule/standard 
dimension is orthogonal to the question of what is the best account of the international 
relations rules. Many of the current doctrines are general rules, reflecting aggregate 
judgments. Usually the U.S. benefits when foreign states do not regulate activities on 
American territory even though the U.S. may not regulate activities on foreign territory—
but this is not always the case. The U.S. might, for example, be willing to run the risk that 
foreign antitrust law will be applied to American companies on American soil so as to be 
able to apply American antitrust law to foreign companies on foreign soil (but which 
export to the U.S.). Or the U.S. might be willing to allow foreign states to regulate the 
practices of foreign businesses who employ foreigners on American soil in return for the 
                                                 
64 Id. at 115 (noting that enforcement of tax judgments is usually a matter of treaty). It might also be that to 
the extent U.S. taxes are lower than foreign taxes, the U.S. treasury loses less from nonenforcement of 
American tax judgments against foreign persons than Americans would lose from enforcement of foreign 
tax judgments against them. We suspect that this kind of substantive disagreement may explain the inability 
of states to enter strict tax treaties—one state’s taxes will always be lower than another state’s—but we 
have not found evidence for this view. 
 We should add that the idea that the revenue and penal rules—and more broadly the “public law 
taboo”—are based on the idea of reciprocity is an old one. In particular, there is a longstanding view that if 
American judges enforced foreign public law, this would deprive the American government of bargaining 
power as it tries to persuade other governments to enforce American judgments by treaty. See F.A. Mann, 
The International Enforcement of Public Rights, 19 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 603, 608-09 (1987). For a 
recent argument to this effect, see Dodge, supra at 224-26. However, we disagree with Dodge’s additional 
argument in favor of an exception for private plaintiffs on fairness grounds. “Fairness demands that the 
interests of private parties seeking to enforce foreign law not be held hostage to the government’s interest 
in promoting reciprocity.” Id. at 230. The problem with this argument is that fairness cuts both ways; 
legitimate individual interests are on both sides. By the logic of Dodge’s own argument, the only way to 
prevent unfairness to American plaintiffs in foreign courts is to deprive foreign plaintiffs of judgments in 
American courts, so that the U.S. government has leverage for effecting change by treaty. Dodge’s 
argument also privileges private victims over the victims whose public law claims are pursued by their 
government; and we see no reason for making such a distinction. 
65 See supra notes __. 
66 The court does, to be sure, cite the entanglement theory as well. 268 F.3d at 112. 
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right to regulate American businesses that employ Americans on foreign soil. The penal 
and revenue rules are “rules”; so are the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act. 
 
 Other doctrines operate more clearly as standards. Consider the public policy 
exception to the choice of law rules. Operating case-by-case, courts evaluate foreign law 
and then respect or reject it by asking whether it is consistent with American public 
policy. For example, when American courts decide whether to enforce foreign civil 
judgments, they make an overall evaluation of the quality of the foreign state’s judicial 
system.67 The implicit assumption appears to be that decision costs are lower when courts 
evaluate foreign civil legal systems than when they evaluate foreign criminal law or tax 
systems. The choice between rules and standards reflects some assessment of decision 
costs and errors costs, and we take no position on whether existing international relations 
doctrines are insufficiently or excessively rule-like.68 
 
 Putting aside the rules/standards issue, we propose that the consequentialist theory 
supplies the most plausible and general account of the international relations doctrines. 
The doctrines operate in a way that is consistent with the theory, and the theory helps 
explain the fact that courts are sometimes willing to endanger comity. Of course it is 
possible to question whether the consequentialist assessment has been properly made, in 
general or in particular cases. Behind the rhetoric, many of the existing disputes are about 
exactly that question; let us turn to the nature of those disputes. 
 
C. Questions and Doubts 
 
 Notwithstanding the plausibility of the consequentialist understanding, its fragility 
should be immediately apparent. The first objection is that most of the time, courts lack 
good tools to make the relevant judgments. Recall that it is important for judges to make 
(1) an empirical determination or conjecture (a) that the foreign state will actually 
reciprocate if deference occurs or (b) that it might retaliate in some way if deference is 
withheld; and (2) a judgment that the benefits of reciprocation or nonretaliation by 
foreign states exceed the cost of deference by the United States. Perhaps some cases are 
easy, but many are difficult. It may well be that in the face of statutory ambiguity, courts 
have no choice but to rely on some kind of presumption. To the extent that statutes are in 
equipoise, the international relations doctrines may well be a sensible way to proceed. To 
                                                 
67 Compare Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2005) (English and American court 
procedures are substantially similar, and English system is fair), and United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425 
(3rd Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 544 U.S. 385 (Japanese trial record and transcript sufficient 
evidence of fair and impartial proceeding), with Bridgeway Corp., 201 F.3d at 142 (determining Liberian 
judicial system was prone to corruption and factionalism), and Choi, 50 F.3d at 250 (lack of notice for 
South Korean property order violates due process).  
68 Jack Goldsmith argues in favor of rules on the ground that standards provide courts with too much 
discretion to affect foreign relations. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign 
Relations Law, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1395 (1999). The argument implicitly assumes that the decision costs in 
foreign relations cases are high, which is plausible, but does not address the question of the content of the 
rules—for example, whether they should generally direct courts to avoid offending foreign sovereigns (like 
sovereign immunity) or to advance American interests (like the penal rule). In any case the executive, as we 
shall see, is in the best position to decide between rules and standards. 
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the extent that the doctrines operate as clear statement principles, defeating the more 
likely interpretation, they are harder to defend. 
 
 A second objection to the consequentialist theory is that courts do not insist as 
much on reciprocity as the theory might appear to suggest. The evidence here is mixed. 
In many cases, courts do mention, and appear to place weight on, the fact that the foreign 
nation in question defers in the same manner that the courts are urged to do.69 But in 
other cases, courts do not discuss the actions of the foreign state, and even reject the 
notion that reciprocity matters.70 Perhaps the threat of some other kind of retaliation is a 
significant motivation. The problem may be that courts simply have no way to determine 
whether the foreign state reciprocated, or would retaliate, and thus fall back on crude 
presumptions that they do in some cases (extraterritorial application of statutes, for 
example) and not others (enforcement of penal judgments, for example).  
 
Whatever the truth, we have trouble seeing a normative justification for many 
applications of the doctrines when the other state does not reciprocate and when the risk 
of retaliation is trivial. For example, it is unclear why the United States should not apply 
its law to acts of sex discrimination by an American company against American workers 
abroad. Nor is it clear that environmental statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act, 
should not apply to decisions by American actors in other nations, at least if it is believed 
that Americans generally have an interest in the continued existence of such species, 
wherever they may be found.71 
 
 A final objection to the consequentialist theory is that it is too narrow. One might 
argue that courts should defer to foreign sovereign interests even when a reciprocal 
benefit is not readily identifiable, because such deference will tend to advance America’s 
international reputation. States may not reciprocate in a narrow way—for example, by 
enforcing American judgments when American courts enforce their judgments—and they 
may not otherwise retaliate, but they may nonetheless reciprocate by cooperating in other 
areas of foreign relations when they might not otherwise be inclined to do so. The 
problem with this argument is that it implies either that courts should always defer to 
foreign interests—which seems unrealistic and implausible—or should calculate the 
general reputational costs from failing to defer, which seems impossible. 
 
                                                 
69 Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1990) (court exercised its 
discretion not to recognize Abu Dhabi judgment because of lack of reciprocity). See generally Hilton v. 
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1895), a seminal Supreme Court case on international comity, which required 
that the reciprocity condition be satisfied. 
70 Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that reciprocity should no 
longer be considered a requirement or concern for foreign judgment recognition); see generally Paul, supra, 
at 49 (arguing that courts do not determine whether foreign sovereign reciprocates); Uniform Foreign 
Money Judgments Recognition Act (not requiring reciprocity for enforcement of foreign judgments); 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 481, reporters’ note 1 (discussing cases on both sides but 
concluding that reciprocity is not required). 
71 On the standing question, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that concrete 
interest is required to challenge failure to apply Endangered Species Act abroad); on the merits, see 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117. (8th Cir. 1990), reversed on standing grounds, Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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A more general question, signaled by these various questions, involves the 
position of the executive. An understanding of the grounds for the international relations 
doctrines, and the legitimate questions and doubts, suggests that that position is crucial, 
as we shall now see. 
 
III. Executive Power 
 
In our view, the executive should be permitted to interpret statutory ambiguities 
so as to defeat the international relations principles. It would follow, for example, that the 
executive should be permitted to construe the civil rights statutes or NEPA so as to apply 
extraterritorially. The executive is in the best position to make the underlying judgments. 
Moreover, the constitutional position of the President in the domain of foreign affairs 
strongly supports this conclusion. But to understand these claims, it is necessary to back 
up a bit. 
 
A. The Chevron Doctrine 
 
1. Two steps. Outside of the context of foreign affairs, the argument for executive 
authority should be familiar, for courts regularly defer to executive interpretations of 
ambiguous statutory provisions. The central idea is most famously associated with 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,72 which involved an ambitious effort by 
the EPA to increase private flexibility under the Clean Air Act.73 Upholding the rule, the 
Supreme Court created a two-step inquiry for assessing executive interpretations of law. 
The first inquiry is whether Congress has directly decided the precise question at issue.74 
If not, the second inquiry is whether the agency’s decision is “permissible,” which is to 
say reasonable.75 The resulting rule is that executive interpretations of ambiguous statutes 
must be upheld so long as they are reasonable—a dramatic grant of law-interpreting 
power to executive agencies. 
 
In explaining this rule, the Court could not, and did not, contend that the relevant 
provision of the Clean Air Act contained any explicit delegation to the executive. Hence 
the Court noted that “sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular 
question is implicit rather than explicit.”76 The Clean Air Act does give the EPA the 
power to issue regulations; in granting that power, perhaps the Act is best taken to say 
that the EPA is implicitly entrusted with the interpretation of statutory terms. The Court 
referred to this possibility, noting that Congress might have wanted the agency to strike 
the relevant balance with the belief “that those with great expertise and charged with 
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so.”77 
But lacking any evidence on the question, the Court did not insist that Congress in fact so 
thought. On the contrary, it said that Congress’s particular intention “matters not.”78  
                                                 
72 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. 
73 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq (2000). 
74 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
75 Id. 
76 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
77 467 U.S. at 865. 
78 Id. 
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Instead the Court referred to two points about institutional competence: as 
compared with executive agencies, judges lack expertise and they are not politically 
accountable. Technical specialization is relevant to interpretation of the Clean Air Act, 
and here the executive has conspicuous advantages over courts.79 And in interpreting law, 
the agency may “properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy 
to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is.”80 The Court was alert to the fact that it was reviewing a decision 
made by the Reagan Administration, altering an interpretation by the Carter 
Administration; and to say the least, the Reagan Administration had a self-conscious 
program for reorienting the administrative state. Some of that program would inevitably 
be undertaken through fresh interpretations of statutory terms. In the Court’s view, that 
was hardly objectionable. It would be appropriate for agencies operating under the Chief 
Executive, rather than judges, to assess “competing interests which Congress itself either 
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved in light of everyday 
realities.”81 
 
What is most striking about this passage, and most relevant for present purposes, 
is the suggestion that resolution of statutory ambiguities requires a judgment about how 
to assess “competing interests.” This is a candid recognition that assessments of policy 
are sometimes indispensable to statutory interpretation—a point with particular 
importance in the context of relations with other nations. Of course we can imagine cases 
in which courts resolve ambiguities through the standard sources — by, for example, 
using dictionaries, consulting statutory structure, deploying canons of construction, or 
relying on legislative history if that technique is thought to be legitimate.82 Under 
Chevron Step One, the executive will lose if the standard sources show that it is wrong.83 
(To the extent that the international relations canons operate as part of Step One, they 
trump executive power under Chevron – a proposition on which we shall cast some 
doubt.84) But sometimes those sources will leave gaps; Chevron itself is such a case, and 
there are many others. If the Court’s analysis is accepted on this point, its deference 
principle seems readily understandable; we shall shortly investigate its relationship to the 
international relations doctrines. 
 
It is an understatement to say that the foundations of the Chevron approach have 
been disputed. Perhaps the Court was saying that the resolution of statutory ambiguities 
sometimes calls for technical expertise, and that when expertise matters, deference would 
be appropriate. On this view, having roots in the New Deal’s enthusiasm for technical 
competence,85 specialized administrators, rather than judges, should make the judgments 
of policy that are realistically at stake in disputes over ambiguous terms. But the Court’s 
                                                 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History, 65 So. Cal. L. Rev. 845 (1992) (arguing in 
defense of use of legislative history). 
83 See, e.g., MCI Telecom. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
84 See below. 
85 See James Landis, The Administrative Process (1935). 
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emphasis on accountability suggested a second possibility: Perhaps the two-step inquiry 
is based on a healthy recognition that in the face of ambiguity, agency decisions must rest 
on judgments of value, and those judgments should be made politically rather than 
judicially. On this view, having roots in legal realism,86 value choices are a significant 
part of statutory construction, and those choices should be made by democratically 
accountable officials. This reading suggests a third and more ambitious possibility: 
Perhaps Chevron is rooted on the separation of powers, requiring courts to accept 
executive interpretations of statutory ambiguities in order to ensure against judicial 
displacement of political judgments.87 In the domain of foreign relations, this possibility 
might seem especially attractive. 
 
But the Supreme Court has settled on a different understanding of the foundations 
of Chevron: Courts defer to agency interpretations of law when and because Congress 
has told them to do so.88 On this view, the deference principle is a reading of legislative 
instruction, and hence Congress has ultimate control over the deference question. The 
problem is that Congress hardly ever states its instructions on the deference question with 
clarity, and hence Chevron cannot be grounded on an explicit or implicit legislative 
instruction on that question. It follows that Chevron rests on a kind of legal fiction,89 to 
the effect that a grant of the authority to make rules and conduct adjudications, and 
perhaps other authority as well,90 carries with it interpretive power too. This, at any rate, 
is the prevailing account of Chevron. 
 
This account raises many questions, and we shall return to it below. For the 
moment, the central point is that executive officers, entrusted with implementing the law, 
are frequently entitled to settle the meaning of ambiguous statutory provisions – a claim 
with evident implications for the international relations doctrines. 
 
3. Limits on deference. Chevron grants a great deal of power to the executive. 
Nonetheless, the deference principle is not unlimited. For our purposes, three limitations 
have particular importance.  
 
(a) Delegated power of interpretation? The executive may not receive Chevron-
style deference if the agency has not exercised delegated power to make rules or to 
undertake adjudications.91 It follows that if Congress has not given the relevant agency 
rulemaking or adjudicatory power, or if the agency, while delegated that power, has not 
exercised it in interpreting the law, the ordinary level of deference may be unavailable.92  
                                                 
86 See Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222 (1931) (outlining various 
ingredients of realist view). 
87 See Douglas Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies, 2 Admin. LJ 269, 277-28 (1988). 
88 United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
89 Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev 363 (1986); Antonin 
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511. 
90 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
91 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-227 (2001).  
92 We use the word “may” because the doctrine is complicated here. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 
222 (2002) (longstanding agency interpretations can be entitled to deference even if not promulgated 
through notice and comment rulemaking). 
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In this way, administrative law principles make it important to distinguish the 
various procedures that precede executive interpretation. At one end of the spectrum is 
the rulemaking or adjudicative procedure that produces an interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute. At the other end of the spectrum is the mere “litigating position,” where the 
executive asserts a particular interpretation for the first time in litigation in which the 
executive is a party or an amicus. Interpretations produced by rulemaking or adjudication 
receive Chevron deference.93 Agency interpretations that emerge from policy statements, 
or from interpretive rules, are often not entitled to Chevron deference, but they do receive 
a measure of respect under Mead and Skidmore.94  
 
By contrast, litigating positions receive no deference at all, apparently on the 
theory that Congress would not want courts to defer to positions that may be 
opportunistic and that are not preceded by any kind of check on possible arbitrariness.95 
The refusal to defer to litigation positions is plausible in general. But it may well be 
inapplicable in the foreign relations setting, where the executive branch simply may not 
be able to set policy through formal procedures or in advance because of the fluidity of 
events. We will return to this point below. 
 
(b) Nondelegation canons? Courts have sometimes denied the executive law-
interpreting authority on the ground that the key decisions must be explicitly made by the 
national lawmaker. The most important principle is that the executive is not permitted to 
construe statutes so as to raise serious constitutional doubts.96 So long as the statute is 
unclear, and the constitutional question serious, Congress must decide to raise that 
question via explicit statement. Some canons of interpretation thus operate as part of the 
court’s analysis during Step One; the executive’s interpretation might fail because it is 
inconsistent with the meaning of the statute, as established, in part, by reference to the 
canon against constitutional avoidance. 
 
Why does the Avoidance Canon overcome the executive’s power of 
interpretation? The reason is that we are speaking of a kind of nondelegation canon—
one that attempts to require Congress to make its instructions exceedingly clear, and that 
does not permit the executive to make constitutionally sensitive decisions on its own.97 
Other interpretive principles, also serving as nondelegation canons, trump Chevron as 
well. One of the most general is the rule of lenity, which says that in the face of 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., State of Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (DC Cir 2000). 
94 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-28; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  
95 See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (no deference to litigating position); 
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 257-58 (EEOC’s litigating position contradicted its earlier stance, 
was not supported by adequate evidence, and therefore not entitled to deference). See also infra text 
accompanying notes __. As we note there, litigating positions receive no deference, but existing decisions 
suggest that Chevron deference might be available when the interpretation is not a product of rulemaking or 
adjudication. The word “might” is crucial, see Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (giving deference 
to such an interpretation.) 
96 See, e.g, Solid Waste Agency v. USACE, 121 S. Ct. 675, 683 (2001); DeBartolo Corp v. Fla. Gulf Coast, 
485 U.S. 568 (1988). 
97 One of us discusses this idea more generally in Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 315 (2000). 
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ambiguity, criminal statutes will be construed favorably to criminal defendants.98 
Similarly, the executive cannot interpret statutes and treaties unfavorably to Native 
Americans.99 Consider also the notion that unless Congress has spoken with clarity, the 
executive is not allowed to apply statutes retroactively.100 There are many other 
examples.101 In areas ranging from broadcasting to the war on terror,102 the 
nondelegation canons operate as constraints on the interpretive discretion of the 
executive.  
 
 (c) Organic statutes and others. Under administrative law principles, it is also 
important to distinguish between statutes that authorize agency action (sometimes called 
“organic” statutes), and more general statutes, such as the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),103 which regulate agency behavior. 
According to standard principles, agencies are entitled to deference insofar as they are 
construing statutes with whose implementation they are charged, but not to deference in 
the interpretation of the more general statutes that regulate their conduct.104 The 
Environmental Protection Agency, for example, does not receive deference insofar as it is 
interpreting FOIA to permit it to keep certain information secret. 
 
For our purposes, we might therefore distinguish between statutes that grant the 
executive the authority to address some foreign affairs problem (“authorizing statutes”) 
and statutes that incorporate a background comity (or anticomity) judgment that applies 
to a range of disputes (“international relations” statutes). Authorizing statutes may be 
general, such as the statute that provides the president with authority to regulate 
immigration,105 or specific, such as the Authorization for Use of Military Force against al 
Qaeda.106 International relations statutes apply regardless of the type of cause of action or 
enforcement, and indeed apply even to common law litigation. Typical international 
relations statutes include the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Uniform Foreign 
Money Judgment Act. Statutes of this kind are indeed general, but they are not akin to 
statutes limiting agency authority, such as FOIA and the APA.  
 
                                                 
98But see Dan Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469 (1996) 
(arguing in favor of deference to prosecutors’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes). 
99See Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F3d 1455, 1461–62 (10th Cir. 1997) (grounding a canon of 
statutory construction favoring Native Americans in “the unique trust relationship between the United 
States and the Indians”); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting in dicta that courts 
“are required to construe statutes favoring Native Americans liberally in their favor”); Tyonek Native Corp 
v. Secretary of Interior, 836 F2d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting in dicta that “statutes benefiting Native 
Americans should be construed liberally in their favor”). 
100 Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). 
101 United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992); National Association of 
Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC, 880 F2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
102 See Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 
Harv. L. Rev. 2047 (2005) (exploring role of international law and canons of construction in interpretation 
of authorization to use military force). 
103 5 USC § 551 et seq. 
104 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 208-09 (2006). 
105 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999) (applying Chevron deference 
principles to immigration statute). 
106 Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
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It is generally agreed that an authorization statute, such as the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act or the Food and Drug Act, is subject to analysis under Chevron.107 In 
addition, there is no reason in principle why that analysis—understood as a recognition of 
the executive’s primary role in advancing interpretations of statutes—cannot be extended 
to an authorization statute such as the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which 
initiated the military attack on Afghanistan.108 To be sure, the law is not settled here. 
When rulemaking and adjudication are not involved, deference may not be available.109 
In our view, however, deference is fully appropriate under any delegation of foreign 
affairs authority to the President. We shall return to the issue in more detail below;110 for 
now, let us simply assert that when Congress grants such authority to the President, it 
ought to be understood to instruct courts to defer to his reasonable interpretations of 
ambiguous statutory terms. Further, international relations statutes may be ambiguous, in 
general or as applied in particular cases, as they reflect general judgments by Congress, 
whose meaning may not be clear in any particular case; again deference to the 
executive’s reasonable interpretations of ambiguous provisions is justified, or so we will 
argue. 
 
C. The Executive and International Comity 
 
 The executive plays an important role in litigation that affects foreign sovereigns, 
even when the executive is not a party. Deference to the executive is an established 
element of many international relations doctrines, but the law has not—peculiarly—
settled on a general principle of deference where an executive agency advances an 
interpretation of a statute that has foreign relations implications.  
 
In this section, we first discuss the established rules and then we turn to our 
recommendations. The argument has a degree of complexity, and it may be useful to set 
out the basic argument in advance. In many cases, the executive should be entitled to 
Chevron deference under the terms of existing doctrine, because it will be acting pursuant 
to some kind of formal procedure or otherwise through channels that trigger Chevron. 
Even if no formal procedure and no such channels are involved, a grant of authority to 
the executive in the domain of foreign affairs ought generally to include a power of 
interpretation, so that Chevron deference is appropriate. If a relevant interpretation exists, 
the comity doctrines are trumped, because they should not be taken to operate as 
constraints on the executive under Chevron Step One. If the interpretation is 
unreasonable, of course, it will be invalid under Step Two; but Step Two invalidations are 
rare in the domestic sphere,111 and they should be rare here as well. If there is no 
                                                 
107 See, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 US 974 (1986) (applying deference principles to 
Food and Drug Act). 
108 See Part IV, infra. 
109 See note supra. 
110 See infra. 
111 See Thomas Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Makes Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation, U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006) (finding that a very small percentage of cases, in the 
Supreme Court and the lower courts, invalidate agency decisions under Step Two). Review of executive 
interpretations for reasonableness nonetheless should be expected to have a significant function. It would, 
for example, raise questions about apparently arbitrary differences across time or across nations, as in an 
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interpretation of a statutory term, but simply a policy judgment by the executive, the 
courts should defer as well, using Chevron as an analogy. The Avoidance Canon provides 
an important exception, and there are others; but the comity doctrines do not belong in 
the same category as that canon or other exceptions. 
 
1. Traditional Deference to the Executive in Foreign Relations 
 
 In some ways, deference to the executive in foreign relations cases is 
commonplace. Before the enactment of the FSIA, courts would relax sovereign immunity 
when the executive suggested that courts should do so. This practice was institutionalized 
in the twentieth century; the Department of State would intervene in cases when it 
believed that the court should take or deny immunity, and courts typically followed the 
view of the Department.112 Indeed, courts deferred to a whole “executive jurisprudence,” 
parsing State Department opinions for principles that would control cases where the State 
Department did not intervene.113 Today, courts continue to take account of the 
executive’s views in FSIA cases114 and engage in pre-FSIA style deference to the 
executive in cases involving head-of-state immunity.115 
 
A strain of thinking about the act of state doctrine has also long held that courts 
should defer when the executive informs them that the act of state doctrine should not 
apply in a particular case.116 In a clear analogy to Chevron, courts also usually defer 
when the executive advances a treaty interpretation,117 and when the executive expresses 
a view about head of state immunity.118 They defer absolutely to executive 
determinations of whether a foreign state “exists” or not.119 And even when the executive 
and Congress come into conflict about the extent of their foreign relations 
responsibilities, in most instances courts effectively defer to the executive by refusing to 
decide on the merits because of concerns about justiciability.120 In the face of such a 
refusal, the views of the executive effectively prevail. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
executive judgment that the civil rights statutes apply in England and Germany but not in France and Italy; 
any such judgment would have to be explained. 
112 See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.  
113 Id. at 487-88.  
114 See infra note __. 
115 See Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004) (deferring to executive’s grant of immunity to president 
of China; United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997) (deferring to executive’s denial of 
immunity to former leader of Panama). 
116 See discussion in Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 420. But see First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 
406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) (rejecting blanket deference to executive). 
117 United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000). A recent war-on-terror case 
exemplifies this view, see United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp.2d 541 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (deferring to 
executive’s interpretation of Geneva Conventions).  
118 Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004).  
119 Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. UPS, 177 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999).  
120 E.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (War Powers resolution); Goldwater v. Carter, 
444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (treaty termination); see also Schneider v. Kissinger, 
412 F.3d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (dismissing a lawsuit based on Henry Kissinger’s authorization of CIA 
intervention in Chile on political question grounds). 
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 Deference to the executive in foreign relations cases is traditionally based on both 
constitutional and functional considerations. Courts sometimes say that the executive has 
the primary foreign relations power.121 This power is sometimes traced to the vesting 
clause of the Constitution, the Commander-in-Chief clause, and other provisions.122 But 
the explicit grants of foreign relations power to the executive are rather sparse and 
ambiguous. From the document itself, it is hardly clear that the executive has “primary” 
authority in the domain of foreign affairs.123 Hence the underlying justifications are often 
less textual than functional, or based on traditional practices and understandings. The 
nation must speak in “one voice” in its foreign policy; the executive can do this, while 
Congress and the courts cannot.124 The executive has expertise and flexibility; can keep 
secrets; can efficiently monitor developments; can act quickly and decisively. The other 
branches cannot.125 Unlike the courts, and as emphasized in Chevron, the executive is 
politically accountable as well as uniquely knowledgeable, and its accountability argues 
for deference to its judgments about how to assess the competing facts and values. Of 
course, none of these advantages justify absolute deference to the executive in all cases, 
and courts have not gone this far. The executive cannot violate a clear law (putting 
constitutional questions to one side). But in cases of ambiguity, courts are inclined to 
defer to the position of the executive. 
 
2. Conflicts Between Regulations and International Comity (Including A Brief Tour) 
 
In light of this longstanding deference to the executive, it is surprising that courts 
have not, so far, consistently and clearly indicated that they will accept the views of the 
executive about whether to apply the international relations doctrines.126 Suppose that the 
executive interprets a statute in a manner that violates those doctrines. Should a court 
defer to the interpretation, or should it reverse the interpretation on the grounds that it 
violates the doctrines?  
 
This question might well pose a literal conflict between Chevron deference and 
the international relations principles. Suppose, for example, that an agency entitled to 
Chevron deference issues a regulation that conflicts with the international relations 
principles. If so, the court must develop rules of priority. Alternatively, the conflict might 
not literally involve Chevron, because the executive has not exercised delegated power to 
make rules or to conduct adjudications127—but it might nonetheless present a difficult 
question of how to reconcile executive power with comity. Suppose, for example, that the 
Department of Justice concludes that the antitrust law should apply outside the territorial 
boundaries of the United States, but the decision does not follow any kind of formal 
                                                 
121 U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936). 
122 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  
123 See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47 (2004)(discussing constitutional 
provisions giving foreign affairs authorities to Congress). 
124 See, e.g., Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413-14 and citations therein. 
125 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
126 Compare Garamendi, supra (deference) and Sosa, supra (deference), with First National City Bank, 
supra (rejecting deference) and Kirkpatrick, supra (rejecting deference). 
127 Note, however, that in some circumstances, an agency is entitled to Chevron deference even if it has not 
exercised such power. See supra.  
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procedure; it is offered in litigation. If so, it is possible that Chevron deference would be 
denied to that decision, on the ground that litigating positions do not receive deference.128 
Nonetheless, we believe that such deference is due to litigating positions in the domain of 
foreign relations; and even if this judgment is rejected, a court might want to pay a great 
deal of attention to the relevant position of the executive, and hence a conflict with the 
comity principles is easily imaginable.  
 
 In the face of such a conflict, a court might take one of three positions. First, it 
could hold that the international comity doctrines prevail over the executive’s 
interpretation. Perhaps the principles would be treated as part of Chevron Step One, and 
hence defeat the executive’s view. Second, a court could hold that the executive’s 
interpretation prevails. Perhaps the executive, in effect, has discretion whether to interpret 
a statute in a way that violates international law or potentially offends foreign sovereigns. 
Third, a court might hold that some middle way is preferable: perhaps the executive 
interpretation and the international comity doctrines receive equal weight. A court might, 
for example, require that the executive take account of international comity, but defer to 
an interpretation that endangers comity for especially good reasons. 
 
 The case law, so far, reflects a range of positions and is difficult to parse; there is 
no settled view about the relationship between the views of the executive and the 
doctrines. In some cases, the views of the executive have proved crucial. In other cases, 
courts have referred to the comity doctrines without paying much attention to the position 
of the executive. 
 
A leading case is Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,129 where the 
Supreme Court indicated the importance of the executive’s view. An alien was ordered to 
be removed to Somalia, his country of birth and citizenship; he objected that he could not 
be removed without consent from Somalia. The statute was unclear, and the Court was 
badly divided on whether such consent was a prerequisite for removal. In resolving the 
question in the government’s favor, the Court seemed to suggest that so long as there was 
room for ambiguity, the executive’s view would prevail.130 Indeed, the Court appeared to 
go well beyond Chevron so as to adopt a kind of clear statement principle, arguing that 
the view of the President would settle the law unless Congress had clearly provided 
otherwise: “To infer an absolute rule of acceptance where Congress has not clearly set it 
forth would run counter to our customary policy of deference to the President in matters 
of foreign affairs.”131 The Court stressed that removal decisions “may implicate our 
relations with foreign powers and require consideration of changing political and 
economic circumstances.”132 In these circumstances, the Court was reluctant to construe 
an ambiguous statute to limit the executive’s discretion. Strikingly, the Court made no 
                                                 
128 See Bower v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988); Florida Manu. Hous. Ass’n v. Cisneros, 
53 F.3d 1565, 1574 (11th Cir. 1995). 
129 543 U.S. 335 (2005). 
130 Id. at 348. 
131 Id.  
132 Id. 
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reference to the possible relevance of international law and the international relations 
doctrines, emphasizing instead the views of the executive. 
 
A contrary signal can be found in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., which 
involved the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII to prohibit employment discrimination 
by an American employer against an American employee on foreign territory.133 The 
defendant argued that the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute violated the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. The Court agreed, but it did not directly confront the Chevron 
issue, because the EEOC does not have the authority to issue rules and EEOC’s 
interpretations have not been consistent.134 In line with our argument here, it would have 
been possible for the Court to follow the view of the current executive and hence to apply 
Title VII extraterritorially because the executive argued for that result. In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Scalia suggested that the presumption against extraterritoriality must 
prevail over the agency’s interpretation, but he gave no account of why the presumption 
should receive priority. More recently, the Court has endorsed the presumption without 
indicating that the executive’s view matters at all; it has treated the presumption as part of 
the analysis under Step One.135 
 
The Court offered mixed and confusing signals in Spector v. Norwegian Cruise 
Line, Ltd.,136 where it held that the Americans with Disabilities Act may be applied to 
foreign-flagged ships except to the extent that application of the ADA would interfere 
with the internal affairs of those ships. In his plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote 
that “general statutes are presumed to apply to conduct that takes place aboard a foreign-
flag vessel in United States territory if the interests of the United States or its citizens, 
rather than interests internal to the ship, are at stake.”137 But such statutes do not apply to 
regulate matters “that involve only the internal order and discipline of the vessel, rather 
than the peace of the port”—an exception rooted in “international comity.”138  
 
Cruise ships flying under foreign flags offer accommodations and travel services 
to over seven million Americans each year,139 and hence the United States had 
considerable interest in protecting its citizens against violations of the ADA (a fact that 
helps account for the executive’s claim that the statute should indeed apply). Hence there 
would be no blanket rule against application of that statute; the outcome would depend on 
whether there would be an effect on the internal affairs of the ship. In answering that 
question, the plurality emphasized the International Convention for Safety of Life At Sea, 
and thus suggested the importance of taking “conflicts with international law into 
account”—but it did so only in the context of indicating that attention to the convention 
                                                 
133 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
134 Id. at 256-57. Justice Scalia, concurring, held that EEOC’s interpretation was not reasonable, even if 
Chevron applied. Id. at 260. The dissent argued that the EEOC’s interpretation was entitled to deference 
and that the statute was best interpreted to apply abroad, at least when U.S. nationals are involved. Id. at 
260-78. 
135 See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005). 
136 124 S. Ct. 2169 (2005). 
137 Id. at 2177. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 2178. 
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was explicitly “urged by the United States” in its brief.140 It is noteworthy, however, that 
no member of the Court paid a great deal of attention to the position of the executive, or 
suggested that that position might be determinative—a striking difference from Jama, 
decided only six months earlier. It would be easy to imagine an opinion to the effect that 
application of the ADA would be justified in large part by reference to the claims of the 
executive, which was in the best position to balance the competing interests. 
 
 In Ali v. Ashcroft,141 the court of appeals refused to defer to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service’s interpretation of a statute that provides for the deportation of 
aliens. The petitioners argued that the statute did not permit deportation to countries 
without functioning governments—Somalia, in this case as in Jama. The government 
claimed that INS regulations permitted such deportation, and were a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute. The court disagreed, holding that, in fact, INS regulations did 
not provide for such deportation. Much more relevantly for our purposes, the court said 
that the petitioners’ interpretation of the statute was consistent with international law—
including customary international law of human rights and three human rights treaties—
given that the petitioners would be subject to human rights abuses if they were returned 
to Somalia. Hence the court suggested that the international comity principles would 
trump the executive’s interpretation, though the absence of clarity in the governing 
regulations made the suggestion less than a holding. It is not at all clear that the court’s 
analysis survives the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Jama. 
 
In Ma v. Ashcroft,142 the court of appeals spoke in similar terms. It held that the 
INS could not indefinitely detain an alien convicted of manslaughter because his home 
country would not repatriate him. The court rejected the agency’s interpretation of its 
authority to detain because Chevron was trumped by the existence of a serious 
constitutional question—here, under the due process clause.143 The court said that 
Chevron principles “are not applicable where a substantial constitutional question is 
raised by an agency's interpretation of a statute it is authorized to construe.”144 This use 
of the Avoidance Canon is entirely compatible with our approach here.145 But the court, 
citing the Charming Betsy canon, also noted that indefinite detention would violate 
international law.146 The notation played only a modest role in the court’s analysis, but it 
is noteworthy that there was no suggestion that the executive’s view might prevail over 
international law. 
 
                                                 
140 Id. at 2180. 
141 346 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003). 
142 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001). 
143 Id. at 1105 n. 15; see also id. at 1106-107. 
144 Id. at 1106. 
145 This principle can be found in many cases in the domain of immigration law. See, e.g., US v. Witkovich, 
353 U.S. 194 (1957); Romero v. INS, 39 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1994); Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
146 See also Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting INS interpretation of 
statute that would permit it to deport petitioner to country where he would be tortured, citing the 
Convention Against Torture and the domestic implementing statute). 
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A major contrast is provided by Corus Staal BV v. Department of Commerce,147 
in which the court of appeals allowed an agency’s interpretation of a statute to defeat the 
Charming Betsy canon. In the court’s view, the agency’s methodology for determining 
whether a firm has engaged in illegal dumping was based on a reasonable interpretation 
of an ambiguous statute, and thus entitled to respect under Chevron. The appellant argued 
that this methodology had been rejected by the World Trade Organization in several 
interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement, a provision of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. The court simply rejected the argument that it should give deference to 
either the GATT or the WTO’s interpretations of GATT articles; the executive’s 
interpretation prevailed.148 
 
 These cases leave a great deal of uncertainty, but we can summarize them, or at 
least their hints, as follows. Where the executive does not express a view on the meaning 
of a statute or the outcome of litigation, courts apply the international relations doctrines. 
Where the executive’s interpretation is ambiguous, arguably unconstitutional, 
unreasonable, or ambiguous, the international comity doctrines are given considerable 
and perhaps decisive weight. Where the executive’s interpretation can be found in a 
formal rule or adjudication, there is a chance that it will prevail over the doctrines. But, as 
noted earlier, cases in the last category are extremely rare—only the trade cases decided 
by the Federal Circuit seem clearly to belong to this category—so the actual approach of 
courts when Chevron and the comity doctrines conflict remains uncertain.149 It is also 
unclear whether courts would defer to the executive when it issues its interpretation in an 
informal manner, not preceded by rulemaking or adjudication. 
 
 The conflicts discussed so far concern the conventional Chevron-style setting 
where the executive advances an interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Other conflicts 
occur without any such interpretation. A recurring controversy is whether in act of state 
cases, courts should defer to the executive’s determination that a decision on the merits 
would or would not cause foreign relations problems. The courts have wavered on this 
issue. In earlier cases, courts generally deferred.150 Although more recently the Supreme 
Court has divided on this issue, courts usually give the executive’s views some weight.151 
In Foreign Sovereign Immunity cases, the courts similarly will take into consideration the 
judgment of the executive that adjudicating the liability of a foreign sovereign would 
                                                 
147 395 F.3d 1343 (1st Cir. 2005). 
148 For similar cases where Chevron deference seemed to trump deference to international trade treaties and 
case law, see Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. U.S., 367 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (holding international 
law concerns were only a “guide”); Timken Co. v. U.S., 354 F.3d 1334 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (Department of 
Commerce interpretation trumped concern over WTO violations); Federal Mogul Corp. v. U.S., 63 F.3d 
1572 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (deferring to Commerce methodologies for determining anti-dumping margins). 
149 Some people have mistakenly interpreted NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 
(1979), as holding that the Charming Betsy canon trumps Chevron deference; but as Bradley explains, this 
view is in error. See Bradley, supra, at 685. 
150 See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), and the discussion 
in Sabbatino, supra at 936. 
151 See Sabbatino, supra; Banco Nacional de Cuba, supra; W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental 
Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 408 (1990). 
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interfere with foreign relations.152 In Anti-Terrorist Act and Alien Tort Statute cases, 
courts have also paid close attention to the executive’s views about the implications of 
the litigation for foreign relations.153  
 
By contrast, we are unaware of cases in which the executive has intervened to 
argue that foreign law or foreign judgments should, or should not, be enforced because of 
their foreign relations implications. As a general matter, however, courts agree that the 
executive’s views should be taken into account when determining whether international 
comity requires them to abstain from deciding a case on the merits.154 
 
 From a doctrinal perspective, this latter group of cases and the Chevron cases are 
different. In the Chevron setting, courts defer to the executive’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous statutory provision because they interpret the authorizing statute as implicitly 
delegating law-interpreting authority to the executive.155 In the other setting, the statute or 
common law is more or less clear, and the court abstains or grants immunity because of 
the executive’s views about the foreign policy implications of a decision on the merits. In 
analytical terms, however, the two settings are similar, and raise identical normative and 
institutional questions. In both settings, the background legal rules reflect a crude 
balancing of the costs and benefits of judicial decisions that may offend foreign 
sovereigns. And in both settings, the question arises whether these background rules are 
so crude, so insensitive to day-to-day changes in foreign relations, and so clumsy in the 
hands of judges who lack information and expertise about foreign relations, that it would 
be better if judges defer to the executive whenever they can do so. 
 
D. The Argument for Executive Power 
 
 Our account of the international relations doctrines and the rationale for the 
Chevron rule imply that in the context of foreign relations, the executive’s interpretations 
should prevail over the comity doctrines. Those doctrines should not be treated as part of 
the court’s analysis under Step One. It follows that courts should defer to the executive’s 
judgment unless it is plainly inconsistent with the statute, unreasonable, or 
constitutionally questionable, because the executive is in the best position to reconcile the 
competing interests, and in the face of statutory silence or ambiguity, Congress should 
therefore be taken to have delegated interpretive power to the executive. If the executive 
                                                 
152 See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 702; Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(allowing U.S. intervention because of “clear foreign policy interests”). 
153 See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 760-61. 
154 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Bustillo v. Johnson, pending before the Supreme Court, also test this 
proposition; in these cases, the executive’s interpretation of a treaty conflicts with the International Court of 
Justice’s interpretation of this treaty. There have been some rare but notable cases where deference, or not 
much deference, was given; e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (holding a state law invalid 
under dormant foreign affairs preemption even though the executive branch said that it did not interfere 
with foreign relations). 
155 Note again that this is a legal fiction, as Justices Scalia and Breyer have independently explained; there 
is no actual instruction from Congress for courts to follow, and in the face of silence, courts attribute, to 
Congress, an instruction to defer. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations 
of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 516-17; Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 
Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370-82 (1986).  
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decides that the statute should be interpreted so as to overcome the comity principles, it 
ought to be permitted to interpret the statute in that way. There is no reason to distrust the 
executive’s competence in making the underlying choices. In fact the Chevron approach 
literally applies to any executive interpretation that follows formal procedures, and the 
logic of the case suggests that it should literally apply as well to interpretations in the 
domain of foreign relations that do not follow such procedures.  
 
It is relevant here that considerations of constitutional structure argue strongly in 
favor of deference to the executive—a point that makes the argument for deference 
stronger than in Chevron itself. Hence it should not be important whether the executive’s 
decision follows rulemaking or adjudication, or otherwise has the force of law. In the 
context of foreign relations, the answer is supplied by the interpretation of the executive, 
subject to the constraint of reasonableness. 
 
 1. Comparative advantages. This conclusion follows whatever the ground for the 
international comity principles. We have criticized the entanglement theory; but even if 
the theory is right, the executive branch, unlike the judiciary, is in a good position to 
know whether concerns about entanglement justify a decision to invoke comity. 
Litigation produces entanglement problems when the decision on the merits is likely to 
offend a foreign sovereign, perhaps leading it to withdraw cooperation in some area of 
foreign relations that are vital to America’s interests. The court has no expertise in 
determining whether a certain kind of litigation will offend a foreign sovereign or not, 
whether the sovereign is likely to respond by reducing cooperation, and whether such 
cooperation is valuable or not. These judgments are all at the core of the foreign relations 
expertise of the executive. 
 
Now consider the consequentialist theory. Recall that this theory holds that the 
U.S. should defer to a foreign act only if (1) the foreign state will or is likely to 
reciprocate for comity, or retaliate for violating the comity rules; and (2) the benefits 
from such reciprocation or nonretaliation exceed the costs of deference. These two 
conditions require complex inquiries, with empirical and normative dimensions, for 
which the executive’s institutional position gives it a decisive advantage over the courts. 
Three points are important here. 
 
 First, the executive branch carefully tracks relations with foreign states, and it is 
in a better position to predict whether a particular act of deference is likely to result in 
reciprocation by foreign states, or whether such statutes would retaliate for a violation of 
the comity principles. The prediction is based on subtle factors—including the nature of 
the relationship with the foreign state, the cultural norms of that state, its legal system and 
other institutions, its politics, and so forth. These are factors followed and assessed by the 
Department of State. They are well beyond the usual kind of judicial factfinding. 
 
 Second, the executive branch is in a better position to understand the benefits of 
foreign reciprocation or the likelihood and costs of retaliation than the court is. Suppose, 
for example, that, in response to litigation against China by Chinese victims of Chinese 
repression, China begins to issue vague threats to Taiwan. Are these threats credible? Are 
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they meant to signal that China will take a more confrontational stance toward Taiwan if 
the U.S. allows Chinese citizens to sue China for human rights violations? Or perhaps 
they merely signal a general chilling of relations, in which case the U.S. may have more 
trouble obtaining Chinese assistance in pressuring Iran to abandon its nuclear plans? 
Courts cannot answer these questions; the executive can. 
 
 The third point involves accountability. In deciding whether American law should 
be applied abroad, or whether a statute should be construed conformably to international 
law, the executive must balance competing interests and make judgments of value. It 
must ask questions not only about reciprocity and retaliation, but also about the 
importance of applying (say) the National Labor Relations Act to protect Americans 
aboard a foreign ship in American waters, or the ban on sex discrimination to American 
companies doing business in China, or the Endangered Species Act to the activities of 
American institutions operating in Japan.156 At least at first glance, those judgments 
should be made by those who are accountable to the public, not by courts. The executive 
might well pay a price if it concludes that American civil rights or environmental law 
ought not to be applied to American activities in other nations. As in the Chevron 
context, the executive is far more likely to be punished by the public if it causes or fails 
to resolve tensions with other countries or a foreign policy crisis than a court is. Indeed, 
although courts routinely anger foreign sovereigns,157 we cannot think of any case where 
the public has put pressure on courts because of such crises—probably because the 
connection between judicial decisions and international tensions is not salient enough. 
 
 The flip side of accountability is concern about political bias. Because courts are 
independent, they may be more neutral than the executive is, and thus, perhaps, more 
likely to interpret the statute impartially. But this concern is identical in the Chevron 
context, where, as we noted, courts have plausibly concluded that the executive’s control 
over policy justifies its heightened authority over the interpretation of statutes. In any 
case judges may have biases of their own. Any relevant “bias” on the part of the 
executive, in the domain of foreign affairs, is best understood as the operation of 
democracy in action—at least if the executive’s interpretation is reasonable and if 
constitutionally sensitive issues are not involved.158 
 
 Thus, the expertise rationale for deference to the executive is stronger in the 
foreign relations setting than in the traditional Chevron setting, while the accountability 
rationale for deference is at least equally strong. These conclusions suggest that if the 
approach in Chevron is correct, then deference to executive interpretations in foreign 
relations cases must also be the appropriate approach. The core reason is that resolution 
of statutory ambiguities involve judgments of policy, and those judgments are best made 
                                                 
156One court has held, however, that the Endangered Species Act applies abroad. See Defenders of Wildlife 
v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that clear text of ESA requires extraterritorial application), 
reversed and vacated on standing grounds, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); but see 
NRDC v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 2002 US Dist LEXIS 26360 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (citing implementing regulatory 
that ESA applies within the United States and also “upon the high seas,” but leaving undecided question 
whether ESA applies “in the territorial waters of another nation.”). 
157 See Lowenfeld, supra, at 618-20. 
158 See infra. 
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by the executive. None of this means that courts have no relevant expertise. Courts might 
have a better sense of how enforcement of foreign judgments may harm the integrity of 
the American judicial system than the executive does. But this advantage is relatively 
minor compared to the advantages of the executive. 
 
 What we have said so far also applies outside the Chevron setting, where statutes 
and common law are relatively clear, and the executive branch argues that the court 
should not decide on the merits. Here, to be sure, there is a greater danger of conflict 
between the executive and Congress, but Congress has not objected to the traditional 
doctrines of executive deference, and until it does so, the constitutional problems seem 
more theoretical than real.159 The normative question is whether the executive’s 
institutional expertise gives it advantages over courts in this setting as it does in the 
Chevron setting, and the answer is surely yes. In both cases, the argument for deference 
to the executive is that it has more expertise in foreign relations than the courts do, and 
that the executive’s accountability for foreign relations is more important than the courts’ 
independence from political pressure.160 
 
 A possible counterargument is that Congress, in one important instance, reduced 
the executive’s influence over foreign relations, and did so with the executive’s approval. 
As noted above, the FSIA was enacted, in part, because diplomatic pressure on the 
Department of State to grant immunity to foreign sovereigns resulted in inconsistent 
decisions.161 Before the statute was enacted, courts would permit lawsuits against foreign 
sovereigns if the Department of State sanctioned such suits, and the Department of State 
generally sanctioned suits when the disputed act was commercial in nature—for example, 
when the defendant was a business owned by the foreign sovereign—and not otherwise. 
The FSIA codified the State Department’s jurisprudence, with some modifications.162 In 
doing so, it drastically reduced the State Department’s discretion to depart from its own 
rules in order to reward friends or punish enemies where United States foreign policy 
interests so required. But the statute itself contains important pockets of executive 
discretion.163 And, more to the point, the Supreme Court has signaled that courts should 
take into account the executive’s view about whether they should exercise jurisdiction 
over a sovereign in any particular case.164 Thus, even a statute that to all appearances 
                                                 
159 With one exception: the Senate has objected to the executive’s claim that its interpretations supersede 
interpretations communicated to the Senate when it consents to a treaty, and it frequently attaches 
conditions to treaties in which it expresses this view. See Gary Michael Buechler, Constitutional Limits on 
the President's Power to Interpret Treaties: The Sofaer Doctrine, the Biden Condition, and the Doctrine of 
Binding Authoritative Representations, 78 Geo. L.J. 1983 (1990). 
160 It is possible to raise one more concern, that of federalism. But courts have had little patience for 
federalism arguments in foreign relations cases; it is clear that the foreign policy of the national 
government prevails over the statutory and common law of the states. See, e.g., American Ins. Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, 537 U.S. 1100 (2003) (executive policy prevails over state law); Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 
(state laws with foreign relations impact preempted even when no conflicting federal statute). 
161 See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. 
162 Id. 
163 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (denying immunity to state sponsors of terror if they have been 
designated as such by the President). 
164 Altmann, 451 U.S. at 701-02 (“should the State Department choose to express its opinion on the 
implications of exercising jurisdiction over particular petitioners in connection with their alleged conduct, 
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takes away the discretion of the executive has been “Chevronized.” The executive and a 
majority of the Supreme Court appear to believe that, although courts can handle routine 
cases involving foreign sovereign defendants, they should continue to defer to the 
executive when it states an interest, despite the fact that such an approach reopens the 
door to political pressure. Once again, the executive’s flexibility and expertise takes 
precedence. 
 
 2. A response. It would be possible to respond that all or some of the comity 
doctrines should be seen as nondelegation principles, and that if this is so, then a clear 
statement from Congress is required in order to produce a result that compromises 
comity. Perhaps the doctrines apply under Step One, and thus forbid contrary 
interpretations from the executive. The most obvious candidate for this approach is the 
principle calling for conformity to international law; perhaps Congress should be required 
to speak clearly if it wants to require to authorize a violation. The same analysis might be 
applied to the canon against extraterritoriality;165 perhaps the executive should not be 
permitted to decide on extraterritorial application of domestic law on its own.  
 
In our view, however, it would not be easy to categorize the comity doctrines as 
nondelegation principles. It is reasonable to say that Congress must speak clearly if it 
seeks to raise a serious constitutional question, and hence that the executive may not raise 
such a question on its own166; courts plausibly insist that the national lawmaker must 
expressly authorize invasions of constitutionally sensitive domains. But in light of the 
distinctive role of the executive in the area of foreign relations,167 a clear statement 
principle, in that area, would make no structural sense, at least as a general rule. A more 
refined argument would attempt to disaggregate the comity principles and urge that one 
or a few of them, such as the principle against violations of international law, trump 
executive interpretations, perhaps if the United States has independently committed itself 
to the relevant international law. At most, however, this argument would justify a narrow 
use of clear statement principles,168 and even such a narrow use is not simple to defend.  
 
E. A Historical Evolution 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that opinion might well be entitled to deference as the considered judgment of the Executive on a particular 
question of foreign policy.”) (footnotes omitted). The court cites several lower court cases that took account 
of the state department’s statements of interest in FSIA cases. Id. at n.21. Although the majority’s language 
is not strong, the dissent furiously objects to it on the ground that it undermines the purpose of the statute. 
Id. at 736 (“Taking what the Court says at face value, the Court does express an opinion on the question: Its 
opinion is that the Executive statement may well be entitled to deference, and so may well supercede 
federal law that gives courts jurisdiction.”). 
165 Cf. Spector, supra note, at 2182, suggesting that the internal affairs clear statement rule is part of a set of 
“clear statement rules [that] ensure that Congress does not, by broad or general language, legislate on a 
sensitive topic inadvertently or without due deliberation.” But see NRDC v. U.S. Department of the Navy, 
2002 US Dist. LEXIS 26360 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (respecting executive regulation requiring Endangered 
Species Act to be applied outside of American territory and on the high seas). 
166 See, e.g., Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F. 3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). 
167 See Jama, 543 U.S. at 348, for a recent statement. 
168 Cf. Spector, supra note, which is consistent with this line of argument insofar as it pays little attention to 
the views of the executive—but in our view, the Court was mistaken not to give weight to those views. 
 37
 Many of the international relations principles are very old. The Charming Betsy 
doctrine, the presumption against extraterritoriality, international comity, foreign 
sovereign immunity, the penal and revenue rules, and the act of state doctrine can all be 
traced back to the nineteenth century, and most of them to the early years of the 
republic.169 Many of them evolved during the ascendancy of ideas that are no longer 
important or even relevant in American jurisprudence—including natural law ideas and 
the pre-Erie conception of the common law—and in a period when the U.S. was a small, 
weak nation whose foreign policy was inward-looking and in some ways isolationist. The 
national government was weaker relative to the states, and the presidency was weaker 
relative to Congress, than they are today.170  
 
To say the least, things are almost unimaginably different today. The vast changes 
in foreign policy, the greater relative power of the United States, the institutional 
structure of American government, and ways of thinking about law suggest, at the least, 
that the international relations principles need to be reconceived. We offer here a brisk 
overview of the relevant developments. The basic point is that Chevron represents a clear 
judicial recognition of changing developments in the domestic domain; a parallel shift, 
recognizing interpretive power for the executive, might well be taken as a recognition of 
related developments on the international side. Indeed, the latter shift, in the domain of 
foreign affairs, is far simpler to explain and to defend than the former one. In these 
circumstances, the real oddity is that domestic law has been “Chevronized” whereas 
foreign relations law has not been. 
 
 It is a commonplace that the rise of the administrative state in the twentieth 
century revolutionized constitutional law.171 Under nineteenth century constitutional law, 
it was assumed that while Congress would regulate the national market, most important 
domestic issues would be controlled by states and municipalities; these included labor-
management relations, environmental protection, commercial fraud, antitrust problems, 
workplace safety, and much more.172 Massive technological change in the late nineteenth 
century -- and the emergence of an industrialized, interdependent, highly urbanized 
national economy -- undermined this allocation of authority. In the twentieth century, 
courts and the political branches ultimately agreed that much regulation would need to 
occur at the national level, despite the losses to local control and other federalism 
values.173 They also agreed that although the executive usually could not act without 
congressional authorization,174 broad delegations of regulatory authority to the executive 
                                                 
169 See The Schooner Charming Betsy, supra (1804) (Charming Betsy doctrine); United States v. Palmer, 16 
U.S. 610 (1818) (presumption against extraterritoriality); Hilton, supra (1895) (International comity); The 
Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812) (foreign sovereign immunity); The Antelope, 10 
Wheat. 66, 123 (1825) (penal rule); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (act of state doctrine). 
170 See Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984 (5th rev. ed. 1985) (tracing the 
rise of the power of the presidency over the course of American history); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The 
Imperial Presidency (2004) (same). 
171 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev 421 (1987). 
172 See Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative 
Capacities (1982). 
173 For an overview, see Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 16-20 (6th ed. 
2006). 
174 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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were necessary and permissible because of the many institutional advantages of the 
executive, including specialization and a capacity for rapid change over time.175 Chevron 
itself can be seen as a culmination of this development. Indeed, the decision is a natural 
product of the repudiation of judge-made common law and of the large-scale shift to 
lawmaking by executive institutions.176 
 
 It is easy to see a parallel process occurring in foreign relations law, though with 
one wrinkle.177 The wrinkle is that the framers agreed that the national government’s 
foreign relations powers would be less restricted than its domestic relations powers, and 
so formally the national government has had a freer hand from the beginning.178 The 
major change was thus in the realm of separation of powers, and specifically the massive 
increase in the executive’s foreign affairs power relative to that of Congress.179 Critics of 
this transformation greatly fear executive overreaching,180 and there is reasonable dispute 
about the extent of this risk and about how best to limit it; but critics and supporters agree 
that changes in the global environment justify at least some expansion of executive 
powers. A modern president, unlike George Washington, needs to be able to respond 
quickly to intercontinental ballistic missiles, cyberattacks, terrorist attacks, global 
financial crises, and other dangers that will not wait for Congress to act. The critics of 
broad executive power have not argued that ambiguities in federal statutes should be 
construed by judges, rather than by the President and those who operate under him. 
 
To say this is not to take a stand on the question whether the President can act on 
his own. It is merely to acknowledge that legislation often grants the executive some 
discretion to act rapidly in response to perceived threats—and hence the increase in 
executive power, usually made possible by statutes, has reflected a recognition by 
Congress itself of this pragmatic point.181 In these circumstances, deference to the 
executive’s views on the meaning of ambiguous statutes, rather than invocation of the 
comity principles, is a step that seems at once modest and a bit late.  
 
 It follows that the argument for Chevron-style deference in foreign affairs is 
similar to, and at least as strong as, the case for such deference in domestic affairs. The 
parallel historical rise in executive power in both contexts, though the explicit permission 
                                                 
175 See Breyer at al., supra note, 71-74. For a classic statement in favor of administrative discretion, see 
James Landis, The Administrative Process (1935). 
176 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, Yale L.J. 
(forthcoming 2006). 
177 See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 Va. L. 
Rev. 1 (1999). As White points out, the transformation of foreign relations law predated the transformation 
of domestic constitutional law by a few decades. This historical fact makes it possible, though perhaps too 
conveniently, to trace the foreign constitutional law transformation to America’s achievement of great 
power status at the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, just as it is possible to trace the domestic 
constitutional law transformation to the period following the Great Depression.  
178 See Bradford Perkins, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865, 59 (1993). 
179 See Schlesinger, supra. 
180 In the context of individual rights, see David Cole, Enemy Aliens (2004). 
181 See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 Yale L.J. 1385 (1989) (describing 
statutes delegating emergency powers to the executive and congressional and judicial acquiescence in 
broad interpretations of those statutes by the executive). 
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or at least acquiescence of Congress as well as courts, is hardly surprising. All that is left 
is to acknowledge the importance of executive deference in foreign relations as clearly as 
we do in the domestic setting. 
 
F. A Note on Congress 
 
 It might be thought that the argument for judicial deference to executive 
interpretation of ambiguous law serves, in a sense, to take the side of the executive 
against the national legislature. On an extreme version of view that we have defended, the 
expertise of the executive, and its special role in the domain of foreign affairs, mean that 
courts should grant discretion to the executive unless Congress has made its view 
unmistakably clear – and possibly even when Congress has done so. Chevron-style 
deference, mixed with a requirement of an exceedingly clear congressional statement, 
might be taken to suggest a transfer of authority, not from courts to the executive, but 
from Congress to the President. 
 
 We do not mean our argument to be taken in this way. The issues we have 
explored involve genuinely ambiguous statutes, and the question is whether the court will 
respect the view of the executive or instead rule in the way indicated by the comity 
doctrines. If Congress seeks to resolve the question, it is entitled to do exactly that under 
Chevron Step One. To be sure, it might be tempting to read the argument for executive 
power to suggest a kind of clear statement principle; perhaps that principle would be 
constitutionally inspired in some domains, as for example with the suggestion that 
Congress should not lightly be taken to intrude on the President’s inherent power to settle 
important questions of foreign relations.182 When the President does have a claim to such 
power, there is indeed reason for a clear statement principle, justified by reference to the 
Avoidance Canon. But the argument we have made is limited to cases of real ambiguity, 
where there is no claim of inherent constitutional power, and where the question is 
whether to follow the views of the executive or instead one or another comity principle. 
 
It follows that nothing we have said bears on cases where the executive asks a 
court to ignore a clear statute because of its foreign relations implications in situations 
where the view of the executive is clearly at odds with that of Congress. A subset of such 
cases includes high-profile conflicts between the executive and Congress, as when the 
executive seizes steel mills in the absence of congressional authorization,183 sends troops 
to war in violation of a statute that restricts the use of troops without congressional 
approval,184 or engages in espionage in apparent conflict with existing statutes.185 Courts 
sometimes resolve these cases by determining which branch has the constitutional 
authority to act; at other times, they avoid resolving these cases on justiciability 
grounds.186 In this Article, we do not express an opinion on these longstanding disputes. 
                                                 
182 See supra (discussing apparent clear statement principle in Jama). 
183 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  
184 See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 24 (Silberman, J., concurring) (arguing that challenge to use of force under 
the War Powers Resolution is nonjusticiable). 
185 See Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, Legal Rationale By Justice Dept. On Spying Effort, New York 
Times, Jan. 20, 2006, at A1. 
186 Compare Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588-89, and Campbell, supra. 
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Our focus, involving problems that are less sensational but far more important to the 
ordinary operation of federal law, is on statutes that are ambiguous rather than clear, 
which is the standard domain of the international relations doctrines. 
 
IV. The AUMF and the War on Terror 
 
It should be clear that the analysis thus far bears on many questions raised by the 
war on terror. It is readily imaginable that congressional enactments will contain 
ambiguous provisions that may or may not be construed to fit with the international 
relations doctrines. The anticomity principles, no less than the comity principles, might 
conflict with the views of the executive in the context of terrorism-related judgments. In 
our view, the executive should be entitled to interpret such provisions as it sees fit, 
subject to the qualifications that its interpretations must be reasonable and that Congress 
must specifically authorize intrusions on constitutionally sensitive interests. 
  
Because of the pervasive importance of the war on terror, the number of 
imaginable cases is large. For example, the executive might want the civil rights statutes 
not to apply to American businesses operating in Saudi Arabia because of the importance 
of Saudi Arabia’s cooperation in combating terrorism. But for purposes of analysis, it 
will be useful to focus on just one example, the 2001 Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force (AUMF), by which Congress authorized the President to 
 
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts 
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.187 
 
If the discussion thus far is correct, the President is permitted to interpret 
ambiguities in the AUMF as he (reasonably) sees fit, even if the consequence is to 
overcome the international comity doctrines. Indeed, the argument for this conclusion is 
even stronger than in ordinary contexts, because the basic purpose of the AUMF is to 
protect the nation in a way that might well compromise comity with at least some other 
nations.  
 
From the standpoint of standard administrative law doctrine, it might be 
responded that with the AUMF, the President has been given neither adjudicatory 
authority nor the authority to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking—and hence that 
he is not authorized to do anything, under the AUMF, having the force and effect of law. 
On this view, elaborated above, the precondition for Chevron deference is absent. This 
argument might be supported with an analogy. The executive branch is not entitled to 
Chevron deference insofar as it is enforcing the criminal law.188 The reason is 
                                                 
187 Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  
188 See Crandon v. U.S., 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990). For an argument that existing law is wrong on this 
count, see Kahan, supra. 
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straightforward: Prosecutors within the Department of Justice have not been delegated 
the authority to interpret the statutes that they implement. For the Department of Justice, 
the power of prosecution is not plausibly taken to confer law-interpreting authority as 
well.189 Perhaps the same can be said when the President implements the AUMF; indeed, 
it might be urged that the President has the same relationship to the AUMF that the 
Department of Justice has to the statutes under which it brings prosecutions. 
 
A narrow response would be that under the AUMF, the President or his delegates 
can indeed make rules and regulations, and hence if they have done so, he or they are 
would be entitled to Chevron deference under standard principles. An authorization to 
use force is best taken to grant the power to issue necessary rules to ensure that force is 
properly used. But suppose that no such rules have been issued. If we step back a bit, we 
will see that the objection to Chevron deference is unconvincing even on its own terms. 
In ordinary Chevron cases, a delegation of law-interpreting power is inferred from the 
authority to produce rules or orders with the force of law. But in the context of an 
authorization to use force, most of the President’s decisions are not preceded by 
rulemaking or adjudication, and hence the grant or denial of such authority is irrelevant. 
By its very nature, any AUMF is best taken as an implicit delegation to the President to 
resolve ambiguities as he (reasonably) sees fit.190 Indeed, this conclusion seems 
appropriate for any delegation of power to the President in the particular domain of 
foreign relations. The President’s interpretation must not, of course, plainly violate the 
law; if it did, it would be struck down under Step One. But insofar as the law is unclear, 
reasonable interpretations deserve respect. 
 
We can approach this question from a different direction. As we have seen, 
Chevron is based on a recognition that the interpretation of ambiguous terms depends not 
on purely legal expertise, but also on judgments about both fact and value.191 Where 
Congress has not spoken, interpretations must depend, at least in part, on assessments of 
the consequences of one or another approach; agencies are in a comparatively good 
position to make such assessments. And where questions of value are at stake, agencies, 
subject as they are to presidential control,192 should resolve those questions as they deem 
most sensible. We have seen that Chevron is based on a legal fiction193 about 
congressional instructions with respect to interpretive power—a fiction that is rooted in 
entirely sensible judgments, pragmatic in character, about institutional capacities. And if 
these are the foundations for Chevron, then the question here is straightforward: the 
                                                 
189 But see Kahan, supra note. The best response, implicit in current law, is that a combination of 
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President should be taken to have the authority to interpret ambiguities as he chooses. 
Interpretation of an authorization to use force, at least as much as any delegation of 
authority to agencies, calls for appreciation of consequences and for complex judgments 
of value. For the AUMF, the best reconstruction of congressional will is that ambiguities 
are subject to presidential interpretation. 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi does not speak in these terms, but its 
conclusion is broadly consistent with them, and we think that our approach is preferable 
to the one taken by the Court.194 The plurality accepted the executive’s claim that the 
AUMF granted it the power to detain Hamdi, notwithstanding the Nondetention Act, 
which forbids the executive to imprison or detain a citizen of the United States without 
congressional authorization.195 The AUMF is quite general, and under standard principles 
of statutory interpretation, it should arguably yield to the prior, relatively specific 
Nondetention Act, which was intended to apply during wartime. However, the plurality 
argued that the AUMF clearly authorized the executive to detain enemy combatants, and 
thus satisfied the Nondetention Act.196 The plurality also noted that the AUMF may 
implicitly incorporate principles of international law, but that these principles did not 
forbid detention of enemy combatants.197 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
argued, not implausibly, that the AUMF was simply too vague to provide the kind of 
clear authorization required by the Nondetention Act for detention of an American 
citizen.198 He also suggested that the AUMF did not authorize the executive to violate 
international law and the detentions did violate (or may have violated) international 
law.199 
 
We believe that even if Justice Souter was correct to say that the AUMF was 
ambiguous rather than clear, the government should have prevailed on its claim that it 
had the authority to detain enemy combatants. If the AUMF was ambiguous, the 
executive should have had discretion to interpret it in a reasonable fashion, and it is 
surely reasonable to conclude that a statute that authorizes the use of force authorizes 
detention. Further, even if both opinions were correct in saying that the AUMF implicitly 
incorporated international law, the government should have prevailed. Because the 
executive has primacy in the interpretation of international law, its not-unreasonable 
interpretation that the detentions complied with international law should control. Indeed, 
the executive should be permitted to violate international law if its interpretation is 
reasonable and if the statute is genuinely ambiguous. Less controversially, our approach 
would permit courts, in future disputes about the scope of the AUMF, to resolve these 
disputes by deferring to reasonable executive interpretations of the AUMF and 
international law (if the AUMF incorporates international law). 
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The difference between our approach and that of the plurality can be seen by 
imagining that active hostilities in Afghanistan cease but the U.S. refuses to release the 
detainees because they continue to pose a terrorist threat. The plurality refused to address 
this issue but implied that the detention would be unlawful: 
 
Further, we understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use of “necessary and 
appropriate force” to include the authority to detain for the duration of the 
relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war 
principles. If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike 
those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that 
understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date.200 
 
The court seems to say that the AUMF implicitly incorporates international law as a 
constraint on executive action, or perhaps that its application to the hypothetical case is 
ambiguous and so the Charming Betsy canon should be applied.201 In any event, the 
court’s interpretation of international law would resolve the issue. We think the better 
approach is to acknowledge the President’s authority to interpret the statute in a 
reasonable fashion, regardless of whether that interpretation results in a violation of 
international law. Thus, the President would decide whether the AUMF permits him to 
detain enemy combatants after active hostilities end but the threat identified in the AUMF 
continues, and the court would defer to a reasonable decision. 
 
Nothing said here suggests that the President’s interpretive power is unlimited. 
Any effort to interpret the AUMF, or any other statute dealing with terror, must contend 
with Chevron Steps One and Two, and hence must count as a reasonable construction of 
ambiguous terms. There are other limitations. Suppose, for example, that the President 
make a plausible claim of statutory authority to engage in actions that threaten 
constitutionally sensitive interests. As we have seen, statutes are generally not construed 
to threaten such interests, even under Chevron. What is the role of the Avoidance Canon 
in the face of executive interpretation? In our view, constitutionally sensitive rights 
should probably have a kind of interpretive priority. It follows that when canons collide, 
liberty generally receives the benefit of the doubt.202 Of course any interpretive canon is 
subject to legislative override. 
 
Conclusion 
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In this Article, we have attempted to understand the international relations 
doctrines and to explore the role of the executive of interpreting ambiguous statutes that 
might be taken to be inconsistent with those doctrines. In our view, the doctrines reflect 
not a concern about entanglement alone, but a rough consequentialist judgment on the 
part of the federal courts, to the effect that the risks to American interests outweigh the 
potential benefits. Courts believe, for example, that a violation of international law is not 
likely to be in the interest of the United States, and hence ambiguous statutes are not 
construed to produce violations or international law. The same assessment underlies the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law. It is for this reason that 
clear congressional authorization is required to threaten international comity.  
 
The obvious problem is that courts are not institutionally well-equipped to make 
the relevant judgments. When the governing statute is vague or ambiguous, there is no 
sufficient reason to forbid the executive to balance the underlying interests as it chooses. 
By virtue of its knowledge and accountability, the executive is in the best position to 
make the appropriate consequentialist judgments – to assess the risks to American 
interests, and the value of importance of (say) applying environmental and civil rights 
statutes outside of the nation’s borders. As a matter of constitutional structure, moreover, 
the President has a distinctive role in this domain. It follows that courts should defer to 
executive interpretations of ambiguous enactments. Deference of this kind would greatly 
simplify the relevant inquiries; it would also ensure that the relevant judgments are made 
by those who are best suited to make them.  
 
If this approach were adopted, the executive would have greater power to 
interpret statutory ambiguities in the domain of foreign affairs. The most serious 
objection to this result is that it would result in an undue concentration of power in the 
executive branch. There are three responses to this objection. The first is that nothing said 
here excludes the possibility that Congress is entitled to the last word; and there can be no 
question that most of the time, clear legislation is controlling. The second response is that 
a grant of authority to the executive may well result in a more expansive use of rights-
protecting provisions in American law; recall that under our approach, the executive is 
permitted to apply the antidiscrimination laws to American companies operating abroad. 
The third response is that other canons of interpretation, most notably constitutional 
avoidance, operate as a check on executive authority. With these qualifications, the grant 
of interpretive discretion to the executive emerges, not as an undue concentration of 
authority, but as a sensible recognition of the inevitable role of judgments of policy and 
principle in resolving statutory ambiguities, and of the advantages of ensuring that those 
judgments are made by those who have relevant information and democratic 
accountability. 
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